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JUSTICE GINSBURG AND THE MIDDLE WAY*
Laura Krugman Ray'
When President Clinton nominated Ruth Bader
Ginsburg to the Supreme Court in 1993, she presented the
nation with a conundrum. To her admirers, and some of her
detractors as well, she was the pioneering liberal litigator who,
as Director of the American Civil Liberties Union's Women's
Rights Project, had scored legal victories that transformed the
jurisprudence of gender discrimination. To observers of her
career on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, she
was a judicial moderate who decided each case on its merits
outside the framework of any controlling ideology. To the
President, she was a consensus builder likely to reduce friction
among the Justices. Her ninety-six to three Senate
confirmation vote suggests that most senators saw in Ginsburg
a range of values well suited to the Court, but not necessarily
the same values. In her nine Terms on the Court, Ginsburg has
probably satisfied most of her supporters, at least part of the
time, while continuing to elude simple labels. She has,
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however, made one thing clear: Her judicial performance
cannot be explained by ideology alone.
Justice Ginsburg would be among the first to accept
that characterization of her work on the Court. In fact, she
presented herself to the Senate Judiciary Committee at her
confirmation hearing as a determined neutral: "Let me try to
state in a nutshell how I view the work of judging. My
approach, I believe, is neither 'liberal' nor 'conservative.'
Rather, it is rooted in the place of the judiciary-of judges-in
our democratic society."' That place is, in her view, a modest
one, behind the people and their elected representatives.2
Judges, particularly the appellate judges who craft the law,
should remain detached from any ideological alliance that
might bias their decisions. Writing several years before her
Supreme Court nomination, Ginsburg called such neutrality
"the hallmark of the federal judiciary." She explained that the
federal judiciary's
greatest figures-Learned Hand perhaps is the best example in this
century-have not been born once or reborn later liberals or
conservatives. They have been independent-thinking individuals
with open, but not drafty, minds, individuals willing to listen and,
throughout their days, to learn. They have been notably skeptical of
party lines; above all, they have exhibited a readiness to reexamine
their own premises, liberal or conservative, as thoroughly as those of
others. They set a model I strive to follow.
4
Ginsburg's judicial model also precludes bold or dramatic
decisionmaking. She told the assembled senators that judges
should act "without fanfare, but with due care," and she quoted
approvingly the observation of another member of her
pantheon, Justice Cardozo, that "U]ustice is not to be taken by
storm. She is to be wooed by slow advances. "'
Ginsburg's vision of a modest, neutral Justice was not a
recent concoction to impress her audience. As a member of the
' 18 HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL
NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
1916-1993: RUTH BADER GINSBURG 260 (Roy M. Mersky et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter
HEARINGS AND REPORTS].
2 id.
' Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause, 9
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 41, 45 (1986).
4 Id.
' HEARINGS AND REPORTS, supra note 1, at 260. Asked later about her role
models, Ginsburg named Learned Hand, Louis Brandeis, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Benjamin Cardozo and John Harlan. Id. at 420.
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for thirteen years
before her elevation, Ginsburg wrote frequently about the work
of appellate courts, and her off-the-bench essays provide some
valuable clues to her judicial record on the Supreme Court.
Ideology turns out to be an inadequate explanation because
Ginsburg's jurisprudence is driven as well by three guiding
principles that define her judicial context: collegiality,
moderation and respect for tradition. As an appellate judge she
sees herself not as an individual actor but as part of a collegial
institution that makes distinct claims on all its members. She
believes that the law should develop with moderation rather
than through radical innovation. And she locates her work
within a tradition of what she calls "way pavers," judges who
are responsible for preparing the ground for those who follow.
This Article explores how Justice Ginsburg has applied
these guiding principles in her nine Terms as a Supreme Court
Justice. Part I draws on Ginsburg's extra-judicial writings to
define the principles of collegiality, moderation and tradition.
The Article then examines her application of these principles to
her majority opinions in Part II, to her dissenting opinions in
Part III and to her concurring opinions in Part IV.
I. THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES
A. Collegiality
Ginsburg's emphasis on the collegial nature of appellate
judging helps to explain one of the vital mainsprings of her
jurisprudence, her powerful sense of institutional identity. In
one of her most important off-the-bench essays, Remarks on
Writing Separately,6 she defines the crucial tension for
appellate judges as "the competing tugs of collegiality and
individuality."7 As an individual, the judge is drawn toward
resolutions that reflect personal ideology in its most direct
form. As a member of a collegial body, however, the judge is
drawn toward resolutions that protect "the well-being of the
court," particularly "the authority and respect its
pronouncements command."8 The appellate judge tempted to
strike out on her own, with a dissent or concurrence that
6 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV.
133 (1990) [hereinafter Writing Separately].
Id. at 141.
8 Id. at 142.
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rejects or modifies the consensus view, must pause to consider
the institutional values at stake. Such a judge, Ginsburg
counsels, "might profitably exercise greater restraint before
writing separately."9
Two years later, in her Madison Lecture delivered
shortly before her nomination to the Supreme Court, Ginsburg
elaborated on what she called "collegiality in style." ° Although
her talk drew considerable attention for its criticism of the
methodology of Roe v. Wade," her discussion of collegiality
sheds more light on her subsequent Supreme Court conduct. In
this lecture, Ginsburg identified "three distinct patterns of
appellate opinion-casting: individual, institutional, and in-
between."2 The individual pattern is typified by the seriatim
opinions of the British Law Lords, while the institutional
pattern is typified by the anonymous court judgments of the
civil law tradition. The American system, evolving from John
Marshall's original insistence on unanimity to his subsequent
tolerance of occasional dissent, is the "middle way," a balanced
resolution of competing interests." Ginsburg herself responds
more strongly to the institutional than to the individual model.
As a Federal Circuit Court judge, she once suggested to her
colleagues that issuance of unanimous panel opinions as per
curiams "would encourage brevity . . . and might speed up
dispositions." 4 She recalled regretfully that her proposal
attracted little support.'0
Although her conception of the middle way does not
require complete avoidance of individual expression, it does call
for significant judicial restraint in matters of both form and
tone:
[Olverindulgence in separate opinion writing may undermine both
the reputation of the judiciary for judgment and the respect accorded
court dispositions. Rule of law virtues of consistency, predictability,
clarity, and stability may be slighted when a court routinely fails to
act as a collegial body. Dangers to the system are posed by two
tendencies: too frequent resort to separate opinions and the
Id. at 134.
10 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1185 (1992) [hereinafter Judicial Voice].
Id. at 1198-1209 (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
12 Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 10, at 1189.
I /d.
' Id. at 1192.
15 Id.
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immoderate tone of statements diverging from the position of the
court's majority."
Citing Justice Brennan's classic defense of the role played by
dissenting opinions," Ginsburg acknowledged their value, 8 but
she remains skeptical of the impulse to write separately unless
the author has an independent legal argument worth making.
Thus, she cited with approval Justice Brandeis's classic dictum
that "it is more important that the applicable rule of law be
settled than that it be settled right."9 She also praised both
Brandeis and Cardozo for their willingness to withdraw
dissenting opinions in common law cases to permit unanimous
results."0
Even when separate opinions are appropriate, Ginsburg
worries about the aggressive tone that marks some dissents. As
an author, she acknowledges that dissents "have a therapeutic
value for the writer" and "can be spicy, more fun to write."'
But she counsels renunciation of such guilty pleasures in favor
of separate opinions that set forth unadorned legal arguments
"without condemning the judgment of one's colleagues as base,
absurd, unprincipled, Orwellian."2 Appellate court judges
should look to their colleagues not as adversaries but as
collaborators. In their comments on circulating drafts, even in
their strong dissents, colleagues are, in a theatrical metaphor,
"both dress rehearsal and opening night critics."23 Viewed from
Ginsburg's perspective, even sharp divisions between members
of a court may be productive sources of improvement as long as
the judge remains willing to engage in "dialogue . . . not
16 Id. at 1191.
17 See William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427
(1986). Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 10, at 1194.
19 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). Ginsburg notes that Brandeis was speaking of statutory interpretation
cases where error could be corrected by legislation. Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra
note 10, at 1191. At her confirmation hearing, Ginsburg again referred to the Brandeis
position, emphasizing the weight to be accorded reliance interests and the stability of
the law: "So the importance of letting the matter stay decided means judges should not
discard precedent simply because they later conclude it would have been better to have
decided the case the other way. That is not enough." HEARINGS AND REPORTS, supra
note 1, at 403.
20 Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 10, at 1191.
21 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Styles of Collegial Judging: One Judge's Perspective,
39 FED. B. NEWS & J. 199, 201 (1992) [hereinafter Styles of Collegial Judging].
22 Id.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Communicating and Commenting on the Court's
Work, 83 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2126 (1995) [hereinafter Communicating and Commenting].
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diatribe."4 In her enthusiasm for the collaborative approach,
she comes close to endorsing, with some irony, Chief Justice
Hughes's reported willingness to incorporate his colleagues'
proposed language, however inconsistent with his own, "and let
the law reviews figure out what it meant."25
B. Moderation
Ginsburg's endorsement of Hughes's expansive attitude
can only be ironic because she has made it clear that, for her,
"the way we decide cases is . . . as important as what we
decide."" As lawmakers in a democracy, judges must proceed
cautiously, with due respect for the parts played by the other
branches of government and by the people. 7 This doctrine of
moderation, applicable to both the occasions for judicial action
and the content of opinions, is the second of the principles
informing Ginsburg's jurisprudence. The caution she urges
should discourage judges from taking bold steps to change the
law. In Ginsburg's formula, "[m]easured motions seem to me
right, in the main, for constitutional as well as common law
adjudication."28 Even in the area of gender discrimination,
where she might be expected to celebrate bolder judicial action,
Ginsburg prefers these "measured motions."29 Recently, she
24 Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 10, at 1186.
25 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Informing the Public About the U.S. Supreme
Court's Work, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275, 283 (1998) (quoting WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST,
THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT Is 302 (1987)). At her confirmation hearing,
Ginsburg spoke about her collegial approach to appellate decisionmaking:
This is an area where style and substance tend to meet. It helps in building
collegiality if you don't take zealous positions, if you don't write in a [sic]
overwrought way, if you state your position logically and without undue
passion for whatever is the position you are developing. Think of [it] this way:
Suppose one colleague drafts an opinion and another is of a different view.
That other says, "Here's what I think, perhaps you can incorporate my ideas
in your opinion, then we can come together in a single opinion for the court;
otherwise, consider this a statement I am thinking about making for myself."
That is one way of inviting or encouraging accommodation.
HEARINGS AND REPORTS, supra note 1, at 407.
"' Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Memory of Herbert Wechsler, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1359, 1361 (2000). Ginsburg attributes the point to Wechsler, though she distinguishes
his absolutist position ("he might say always") from her own more qualified approach
("I would say ordinarily"). Id. In an earlier piece, she credited a similar point to
Patricia Wald, at the time Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Circuit: "it is vitally
important how [cases] are decided, not just that they are decided." Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, A Plea for Legislative Review, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 995, 1007 (1987).
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approvingly noted the steady, gradual pace of Supreme Court
decisions on gender discrimination from the 1970s leading to
her own majority opinion in the Virginia Military Institute
("VMI") case."° Indicating her endorsement of this moderate
pace, she stated: "The Court wrote modestly, it put forth no
grand philosophy."01 Its gradualist approach permitted the
other branches of government to reconsider their own use of
gender classifications in light of the changing law and even, in
one instance, rendered a pending case moot.3' For Ginsburg,
judicial caution that obviates the need for judicial decision-
making is an institutional virtue.
Ginsburg has found the principle of moderation equally
applicable to the work of intermediate appellate courts and of
the Supreme Court. As a circuit court judge, constrained by the
narrow questions of statutory and administrative law that
often formed the bulk of her court's docket, she observed that
the nature of the cases combined with the collegiality principle
"to tug judges strongly toward the middle, toward moderation
and away from startlingly creative or excessively rigid
positions."3 Writing seven years later, after six Terms on the
Supreme Court, she recast the issue to reflect the rather
different situation of the Court's heavily constitutional docket.
In this context, the constraint was the precedential force of
Supreme Court decisions: "The reality that decisions set
precedent tugs us strongly toward the middle; it also tends to
discourage expression of unprecedented, startlingly creative
views."' The common note is the tug toward moderation, away
from "creative" lawmaking, reflecting a clearly expressed
distaste for the doctrinal adventures of an individualistic judge.
It is no coincidence that Ginsburg has named as her Supreme
Court Justice role models Brandeis, Cardozo and the second
30 United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
31 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United States as
a Means of Advancing the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under the Law, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 263, 270 (1997) [hereinafter Constitutional Adjudication].
"' Id. at 270-71, 271 n.26 (referring to Edwards v. Schlesinger, 377 F. Supp.
1091 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Waldie v. Schlesinger, 509 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir.
1974), which Congress mooted by its reversal of the policy excluding women from the
United States military academies).
'3 Ginsburg, Styles of Collegial Judging, supra note 21, at 200.




Justice Harlan rather than such unconstrained champions of
equality and individual rights as Black, Douglas and Warren.35
This preference for moderation is linked to Ginsburg's
belief that the Court, lacking any enforcement capacity and
largely dependent for its power on the respect it commands,
must be careful not to move too far in front of the national
mood. "[Tihe Justices," she has noted, "generally follow, they do
not lead, changes taking place elsewhere in society."36 Ideally,
the Court, like its Justices, acts cautiously, implementing
change at a pace that validates constitutional values without
alarming an unprepared nation. She has argued for the
pragmatic advantages of this judicial gradualism: "But without
taking giant strides and thereby risking a backlash too forceful
to contain, the Court, through constitutional adjudication, can
reinforce or signal a green light for a social change."37 Her
criticism of Roe is based on the boldness of the decision, which,
in her view, cut off change through the political process and
provoked precisely the kind of backlash that undermines both
the Court and its holdings.
C. Tradition
Ginsburg's preference for judicial moderation and
gradualism is linked to the third principle informing her
jurisprudence, the chain of influence that she calls "way
paving." She has used the expression in talks about women in
the federal judiciary, Jewish Supreme Court Justices and
Jewish women, in each instance defining herself as the
beneficiary of a long-standing tradition.38 Just as Florence
15 At her confirmation hearing, Ginsburg described the second Justice Harlan
as "one of my heroes as a great Justice." HEARINGS AND REPORTS, supra note 1, at 172.
For a comparison of Harlan and Ginsburg, see Toni J. Ellington, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and John Marshall Harlan: A Justice and Her Hero, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 797 (1998),
especially Ellington's discussion of the use by both Justices of separate opinions as
'pathmarkers" for gradual change in the law. Id. at 825-31. In contrast, Ginsburg has
pointed to Justice Black as an example of a highly individualistic judge who "carried a
copy of the Constitution in his pocket and looked to our fundamental instrument of
government for answers to constitutional questions, without large concern for the
different opinions of his colleagues." Ginsburg, Styles of Collegial Judging, supra note
21, at 199.
'6 Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 10, at 1208.
37 Id. Jeffrey Rosen has described Ginsburg the Justice as "a cautious codifier
of popular opinion rather than a crusader for social reform." Jeffrey Rosen, The New
Look of Liberalism on the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, sec. 6, at 65.
31 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections on Way Paving Jewish Justices and
Jewish Women, 14 TOURO L. REV. 283 (1998); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Laura W. Brill,
Women in the Federal Judiciary: Three Way Pavers and the Exhilarating Change
[Vol. 68: 3
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Allen, the first woman named to a federal appeals court,
marked the path later followed by the substantial number of
women appointed by President Carter, including Ginsburg
herself, so the line of Jewish Justices, starting with Brandeis,
runs directly to Ginsburg and her colleague, Justice Breyer.
The way pavers may begin with difficult and unwelcome
steps-Judge Allen's 1934 appointment apparently sent a Sixth
Circuit colleague to his sickbed for two days 9 -but they make
possible the achievements of those who follow.
For Ginsburg, the line of way pavers is analagous to the
line of judicial precedent that also draws strength from what
has come before. These two lines converge for her in Justice
O'Connor, her forerunner on the Court and the author of
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,4° the decision
holding unconstitutional the state's women-only nursing
school. Just as Ginsburg followed O'Connor to the Court twelve
years later, Ginsburg's opinion in United States v. Virginia
("VMT'), holding unconstitutional VMI's men-only admissions
policy, followed Hogan by fourteen years.4' These lines of
precedent, both personal and jurisprudential, impose an
obligation on grateful recipients "to do our best for the sake of
the law and for the sake of those for whom we pave the way."' 2
Ginsburg sees herself not only as the inheritor of a tradition,
but as the shaper of one. Speaking to students at a law review
dinner, she advised them to "leave tracks," to become way
pavers for the lawyers and judges to follow.43
The three principles shaping Ginsburg's approach to her
work on the Court are linked in several ways. Her commitment
to collegiality and her strong sense of tradition have in common
a rejection of the Justice as unconstrained individualist.
Ginsburg locates herself in a tradition, reaching from Brandeis
to Cardozo to Harlan, in which the judge is not liberated by
appointment to the Supreme Court but instead willingly
subjects herself to the constraints of the institution and its
history. Ginsburg's preference for advancing doctrine by
President Carter Wrought, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 281 (1995) [hereinafter Women in the
Federal Judiciary].
'9 Ginsburg & Brill, Women in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 38, at 283.
40 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
41 Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 31, at 270.
42 Ginsburg & Brill, Women in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 38, at 289.
4' Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks, New York Law School Law Review
Dinner, 44 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 7, 10 (2000).
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"measured motions" rather than creative leaps also reflects the
principle of collegiality. The Court has its colleagues as well,
the other two branches of government, the state courts and the
national community. Even when it acts to vindicate central
constitutional values like equality, the Court must remain
sensitive to the responses of those constituencies. Completing
the circle, the pull of a continuing tradition acts to restrain the
Court from jumping the track and moving too vigorously to
transform doctrine. The Court and its Justices are constrained
not just by their present colleagues but also by the way pavers
who came before and by those who will follow.
Although Ginsburg completed most of her off-the-bench
writing while she sat on a circuit court subject to the
supervision of the Supreme Court, the pieces written after her
appointment reveal no sudden change in her perspective. If, as
she repeatedly tells us, appellate judges, including Supreme
Court Justices, should accept the constraints imposed by
collegiality, moderation and tradition, we may fairly ask
whether she has applied her theory to her practice. This Article
now turns to Justice Ginsburg's Supreme Court opinions to
answer that question.
II. WRITING FOR THE COURT
In her nine Terms, Ginsburg has written eighty
opinions for the Court." The most remarkable aspect of this
body of work is how unremarkable most of these opinions are.
Of the eighty, she wrote twenty-eight-over one third-for a
unanimous Court, and those opinions contain little
controversial matter. The dissenting votes in the remaining
opinions tend, with substantial consistency, to be those of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, with a
smaller number of appearances by Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor, and a handful of cases containing dissents by such
usual Ginsburg allies as Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer.
44 This figure is based on the Harvard Law Review's annual statistical
summary of the Supreme Court's Term. The Supreme Court 2001 Term, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 13, 453 (2002); The Supreme Court 2000 Term, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1, 539 (2001);
The Supreme Court 1999 Term, 114 HARV. L. REV. 23, 390 (2000); The Supreme Court
1998 Term, 113 HARV. L. REV. 26, 400 (1999); The Supreme Court 1997 Term, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1, 366 (1998); The Supreme Court 1996 Term, 111 HARV. L. REV. 51, 431
(1997); The Supreme Court 1995 Term, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 367 (1996); The Supreme
Court 1994 Term, 109 HARV. L. REV. 10, 340 (1995); The Supreme Court 1993 Term,
108 HARv. L. REV. 26, 372 (1994).
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Many of the cases (like much of the Court's docket) raised
statutory interpretation issues, which Ginsburg resolved in a
straightforward manner, without elaborate digressions or
discussions of policy implications. Most striking is the number
of cases dealing with civil procedure issues. Ginsburg taught
civil procedure and published in the field during her academic
career, and her opinions in this area are clear, concise and
confident.45 So far as members of the Court may be said to have
staked out areas of particular expertise or interest, Ginsburg
seems to have established herself as the resident proceduralist.
Most of Ginsburg's majority opinions follow the
strictures laid down in her off-the-bench writing. They seek,
and often find, consensus; they avoid broad resolutions or
expansive discussion; where there is disagreement, they refrain
from strong criticisms of the dissident Justices. Her opinions
demonstrate concern for both form and substance. Even the
style and diction of these opinions tend to follow the path of
moderation, usually avoiding the colorful word or distinctive
phrase in favor of a solid, impersonal style. Writing for the
Court, Ginsburg is almost without exception a model of the
collegial Justice.
Yet, even her earliest opinions for the Court signal that
Ginsburg's middle way does not require the complete extinction
of judicial personality. In her second Term, Ginsburg made a
point of referring to a hypothetical generic customer in a
banking regulation case as a female.46 The gesture was small
but clearly intended to be noticed, and it heralded a more
assertive stance. In her final Court opinion of the 1994 Term,
Ginsburg seemed for the first time eager to find her own voice.
4' Ginsburg's first post-clerkship position was as a research associate for
Columbia University School of Law's Project on International Procedure from 1961-62;
the following year she served as the associate director. As a faculty member at the law
schools of Rutgers University (Newark) from 1963-72 and Columbia from 1972-80, she
taught civil procedure and conflict of laws regularly and comparative law and
procedure occasionally. Ginsburg's publication list submitted to the Senate at the time
of her confirmation includes a book on Swedish civil procedure, a project for which she
learned Swedish and spent time in Sweden, together with ten law review articles and
book chapters on procedural topics. Beginning in the early 1970s, the focus of her
scholarship shifted to issues of gender discrimination; in 1972, she became director of
the Women's Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union. HEARINGS AND
REPORTS, supra note 1, at 264-65, 272-74. For a discussion of Ginsburg's approach to
procedural issues, see Elijah Yip & Eric K. Yamamoto, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's
Jurisprudence of Process and Procedure, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 647 (1998).
NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S.
251, 259 (1995). The opinion was unanimous.
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The issue in Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno4 was whether
the Attorney General's certification that a federal agent acted
within the scope of his employment was subject to judicial
review. Since the agent at issue had acted in a foreign nation,
the Attorney General invoked sovereign immunity under an
exception to the Federal Torts Claims Act, thus leaving the
plaintiffs without remedy. Unlike the uninflected application of
basic statutory interpretation principles in her earlier opinions,
Ginsburg's approach in Lamagno was considerably more
complicated. At the outset, Ginsburg was openly critical of the
relevant provision, which she described as "a statutory fog."48
More broadly, she found "perplexing"49 the consequences of
denying federal courts the authority to review an executive
branch ruling determining access to the courts: "[T]he proposed
reading would cast Article III judges in the role of petty
functionaries, persons required to enter as a court judgment an
executive officer's decision, but stripped of capacity to evaluate
independently whether the executive's decision is correct.""
Declaring the notion that Congress would assign the federal
courts "only rubber-stamp work" an affront, she described the
scheme approved below as "surreal" in its exclusion of any "fair
proceeding. " 51
The larger context in which she placed the federal law
contained a principle central to her jurisprudence: the
protective role of the federal courts in providing judicial review
of executive branch determinations to afford litigants fair and
disinterested resolutions of their legal claims. Ginsburg
underscored the resonance of this value with the sources she
cited: not only James Madison in The Federalist but also
Blackstone, Pascal and Publius Syrus.52 She also signaled her
strong engagement with the case through her mild but distinct
irritation with Justice Souter's dissent, whose "abstract and
unrelenting logic," she noted, would always produce the same
result for this class of cases: "[P]Ilaintiffs always lose."53 That
47 515 U.S. 417 (1995).
48 Id. at 425.
49 Id. at 426.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 429.
52 Lamagno, 515 U.S. at 428-29. The latter two citations also display a
breadth of learning not usually displayed in Court opinions. Westlaw finds no other
citations to Pascal or Publius Syrus in Supreme Court opinions.
" Id. at 436 n.ll. Justice Souter's dissent was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and by Justices Scalia and Thomas. Id. at 438.
[Vol. 68: 3
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irritation was consigned to a footnote, but it is notable as the
first occasion on which Ginsburg, writing for the Court,
criticized her dissenters.
In the following Term, Ginsburg was assigned her best
known opinion, VMI,54 a case challenging single-sex education
and thus linked directly to her experience in the 1970s
litigating gender discrimination cases with the Women's Rights
Project. As an advocate, Ginsburg argued six gender cases
before the Supreme Court, losing only one.55 She also wrote
briefs for the Court in several other cases, including a seminal
amicus submission she later called "the grandmother brief"'56 in
Reed v. Reed, the foundational case that first identified gender
discrimination as an equal protection violation. 7 In shaping
her litigation campaign, Ginsburg combined a bold legal
argument-that gender discrimination should be judged by the
same strict scrutiny standard applied to racial discrimination-
with a more moderate strategy of steady progress.58 Her
strategy recognized that "courts needed .to be educated and that
requires patience. It may even mean holding back a case until
the way has been paved for it."" She selected her cases, each
carefully building on its predecessors, with an eye to their
likely success. This analysis included her assessment of the
Justices' probable responses. As a result, a number of her
plaintiffs were males disadvantaged by statutes based on the
same gender stereotypes that more commonly restricted
females." This blending of a radical goal with a cautious
strategy seems typical of Ginsburg's preference for moderation,
even in the pursuit of dramatic legal change.
518 U.S. 515 (1996).
'5 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977); Edwards v. Healy, 421 U.S. 772 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973). The Court decided against Ginsburg in Kahn.
Ginsburg has said that "[tihe basic argument in all these briefs" in fact
"came from the Reed brief-the 'grandmother' brief." Ruth B. Cowan, Women's Rights
Through Litigation: An Examination of the American Civil Liberties Union Women's
Rights Project, 1971-1976, 8 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 373, 392 (1976) (quoting an
interview with Ruth Bader Ginsburg (June 25, 1975)).
57 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding an Idaho statute preferring men over women
as estate administrators a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
'" For a thorough account of Ginsburg's litigation of gender discrimination
cases, see Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Change: One Woman's Work to Change
the Law, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 73 (1989).
59 Jeanette Friedman, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Rare Interview, LIFESTYLES,
March 1994, at 6.
60 Markowitz, supra note 58, at 97.
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Coming as it did a quarter century after Reed, the
opinion in VMI offered Ginsburg an opportunity to celebrate
the fruits of her past successes and to enlarge the boundaries of
women's rights. Ginsburg welcomed that opportunity in her
characteristically modest manner, writing an opinion that
seems more interested in consolidating gains than in pushing
limits. She opened the analytic section of the opinion with one
of her favorite adjectives, citing "this Court's pathmarking
decisions" as the source of the standard to be applied, the
"exceedingly persuasive justification" needed to maintain VMI
as a single-sex institution closed to women." She traced the
line of precedent back to Reed, which she treated as the origin
of the now established principle that government violates equal
protection when its law "denies to women, simply because they
are women, full citizenship stature-equal opportunity to
aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society based
on their individual talents and capacities."" This principle
explained the central flaw in VMI's admissions policy, its focus
on what Virginia viewed as the inability of "most women" 3 to
tolerate the school's rigorous adversative method rather than
on the acknowledged ability of some women, however few, to
thrive under the system.
Just as Ginsburg began her analysis with Reed as the
jurisprudential source for her opinion, she ended it with
another pathmarking decision, Sweatt v. Painter,64 where the
Court ruled that a new law school created by the state of Texas
for black students was not substantially equal to the
University of Texas's law school. By invoking Sweatt as the
precedent controlling the adequacy of Virginia's proffered
remedy of a separate program for women, Ginsburg placed her
opinion within two distinct but related traditions, the women's
rights line of cases, which she helped to shape, and the earlier
racial discrimination line of cases.
Although the VMI opinion makes its point effectively, it
does so without any of the rhetorical flourishes that might have
proved irresistible to another Justice with Ginsburg's litigation
history. Only the mildest of metaphors appear. Ginsburg
1 United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). Although the
language "exceedingly persuasive justification" did not appear in Reed, Ginsburg
clearly viewed the case as the first step in the Court's development of that standard.
62 Id. at 532.
63 Id. at 550.
339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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chastised Virginia for a plan that served her "sons" but made
"no provision whatever for her daughters,"65 a family image
that was echoed toward the end of the opinion to emphasize the
unfair exclusion of women from VMI's benefits." When
Ginsburg described the basis for nineteenth century experts'
opposition to education for women-including the harm to their
health and reproductive capacity-she did so in a neutral
footnote, resisting the temptation to ridicule the discredited
theories." Of the eight sitting Justices, only two failed to join
Ginsburg's opinion; Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote separately
to concur in the judgment, and Justice Scalia dissented.
Ginsburg referred only briefly to the sole dissenter, once in a
footnote to suggest that, on one point, "the dissent sees fire
where there is no flame," 8 and again in a good-natured
observation that "even our dissenting colleague might agree"
that most men, like most women, would not choose VMI's
adversative educational climate.69 Even the dissenter was
briefly brought within the fold, willingly or not, to join the
consensus that, whatever its virtues, the VMI method is not for
everyone.
Most striking about Ginsburg's VMI opinion is the total
absence of any indication that its author was a major player in
the development of gender discrimination law. Although it is
not common for Justices to interject bits of personal history
into their opinions, there are what Ginsburg would call way
pavers for the practice, generally authors of dissents or
concurrences who reveal some personal link to the legal
substance of a case. In his celebrated Youngstown Sheet &
Tube concurrence, Robert Jackson made clear his role as
advisor to President Roosevelt and, directly related to
Youngstown, his endorsement as Attorney General of the
government's right to seize an aircraft plant." Similarly,
Justice Black referred more broadly to his expertise in
statutory interpretation accumulated during his years as a
VMI, 518 U.S. at 540.
Id. at 557 (noting that "Virginia has closed this facility to its daughters").
67 Id. at 536 n.9. According to one of the sources Ginsburg cites, "the
physiological effects of hard study and academic competition with boys would interfere
with the development of girls' reproductive organs." Id.
68 Id. at 535 n.8.
69 Id. at 542.




senator, 71 and Justice Douglas commented occasionally on his
personal knowledge or experience in connection with the
subject matter of a case.2 In a 1998 Court opinion, Ginsburg
did cite one of her own academic publications, a Harvard Law
Review article on the full faith and credit doctrine, but the cite
appeared discreetly in a footnote.73 Since the reference
contained only the author's not uncommon last name, many
readers (among the subset of those who peruse footnotes) might
remain unaware that she was the author of both opinion and
article.
The VMI opinion tested Ginsburg's professional modesty
more severely because 'her prominent role in establishing the
line of controlling precedents is widely known and respected.
Yet in handling this remarkable judicial moment, she was
guided by the principle of collegiality, which encourages the
author of a collective opinion-here one commanding the votes
of six out of eight sitting Justices-to restrain her individuality
and speak instead in a detached and neutral voice. No
uninformed reader of VMI would have any reason to suspect
the author's contribution to the legal principles she articulated
or the particular satisfaction she must have felt in writing the
opinion.
The choice of an impersonal mode of expression is
related to Ginsburg's clearly demonstrated preference for a
judicial style that avoids dramatic outbursts or emotional
rhetoric of any sort. That preference appears most notably in
cases concerning topics that in other hands might generate
warmer expression. In M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,74 for example, the issue
was whether the biological mother of two children could be
precluded from appealing the termination of her parental
rights because she was unable to pay the cost of preparing a
transcipt. A majority of six Justices held that the Mississippi
statute conditioning the mother's right of appeal on her ability
to pay violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses.7 One might excuse a Justice faced
71 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 164-65 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
71 See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 335 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (noting that, "coming as I do from Indian country in Washington," he is
familiar with the philosophies of young Indians).
73 Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 236 n.9 (1998). The article cited
is Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The Last-in-
Time Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82 HARv. L. REV. 798 (1969).
74 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
" Id. at 107. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, and three members
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with the emotional issue of parental rights and a divided Court
for employing heightened rhetoric to describe the significant
deprivation imposed on the petitioner. Instead, Ginsburg
acknowledged the importance of the issue while simultaneously
placing it in a distinctly legal context: "We approach M. L. B.'s
petition mindful of the gravity of the sanction imposed on her
and in light of two prior decisions most immediately in point."76
Her opinion never discussed the significance of the bond
between parent and child, the sanctity of the family or the
devastating nature of the blow to the petitioner. In finding for
the petitioner, she never employed any of the eminently
quotable language like that used by other Justices in many of
the Court's earlier substantive due process cases.
Instead, Ginsburg made clear in calm and understated
language the values involved in the case and its serious
implications for the petitioner: "She is endeavoring to defend
against the State's destruction of her family bonds, and to
resist the brand associated with a parental unfitness
adjudication."" The severity of the consequences, Ginsburg
then observed, was "the very reason we have paired her case"
with a more protective precedent rather than with two cases
more tolerant of state interests.7 ' The opinion gave the
petitioner a victory on the merits, but it offered little in the way
of rhetorical sympathy.
The same calm and reasoned tone marks two other
opinions treating potentially emotional subjects. In Olmstead v.
Zimring,79 Ginsburg wrote for a divided Court to hold that the
state's refusal to move two mentally disabled women from an
institutional facility to a community-based program constituted
discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act.8° In
defining the respondents' "unjustified institutional isolation" as
of the Court-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas-dissented.
76 Id. at 117.
77 Id. at 125.
78 Id. Ginsburg found that the case was controlled by Mayer v. Chicago, 404
U.S. 189 (1971), where the Court recognized an indigent criminal defendant's right to a
transcript for two nonfelony offenses, rather than by Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656
(1973) and United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), where the Court found no
fundamental interest and declined to waive court fees for the review of a reduction in
welfare benefits and for a bankruptcy filing.
79 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
8I Id. at 597. The Court also recognized that the right of the respondents to a
community-based placement was subject to the trial court's assessment of the state's




"a form of discrimination," Ginsburg found that such placement
"perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so
isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in
community life" and "diminishes the everyday life activities of
individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work
options, economic independence, educational advancement, and
cultural enrichment."
81
The rejection of "unwarranted assumptions" about the
capacities of individuals has long been central to Ginsburg's
thinking about women's rights. She has written that
"[g]eneralizations about the way women or men are-my life
experience bears out-cannot guide me reliably in making
decisions about particular individuals,"82 a position that found
expression in her appellate advocacy and eventually in VMI."3
In light of such deeply held views, it is not difficult to imagine
an Olmstead opinion framed more broadly to challenge
government willingness to classify people based on easy but
unrefined categories. It is characteristic of Ginsburg, however,
that in writing for the Court she preferred to address the legal
issue before her without enlarging the scope of the opinion to
accommodate a wider perspective. Olmstead also reflects
Ginsburg's insistence on maintaining a detached and
unemotional tone.
That detached tone was also notable in a capital
punishment case, Shafer v. South Carolina," where the
defendant was sentenced to death after the trial court rejected
his requested jury instruction that, if sentenced to life
imprisonment, he would be ineligible for parole. Ginsburg
presented the issue as "whether the South Carolina Supreme
Court misread our precedent" in refusing to apply an earlier
decision to its sentencing scheme.85 Again, there was no
mention of the irreversible consequences of a capital sentence
or of the particular care that courts must exercise when
supervising such momentous determinations. The defendant
prevailed and the South Carolina Supreme Court was reversed,
" Id. at 600-01.
82 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Grand Ideal for the Future, OREGON STATE BAR
BULL., Aug.-Sept. 1993, at 19, 21. Ginsburg used the same passage in a later talk. See
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women's Progress in the Legal Profession in the
United States, 33 TULSA L.J. 13, 20 (1997).
83 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
84 532 U.S. 36 (2001).
' Id. at 40.
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but without any lecture or scolding. The opinion was carefully
constructed, clearly presented and completely unemotional; it
is the quintessential Ginsburg opinion.
Ginsburg's preference for moderation extends beyond
tone to the scope of her opinions. She consistently declines to go
beyond the narrow legal contours of a case, looking to
precedent as her primary tool.8" As she announced early in one
opinion, "[p]recedent guides our review,"87 and she is reluctant
to supplement precedent with innovative doctrine or policy-
based arguments. Such statements by other appellate judges
may signal little more than lip service to the force of precedent,
but from Ginsburg they provide an essentially accurate account
of her decisionmaking process. A typical Ginsburg opinion
identifies the controlling precedent, describes in some detail its
holding and applies it to the case before her with precision.
Ginsburg is not, however, so rigidly committed to precedent
that she strains to harmonize divergent cases. Recently, faced
with two conflicting decisions, she overturned one and
approvingly quoted Justice Kennedy's observation that "[olur
precedents are not sacrosanct."8 Even precedent is subject to
the moderating effect of reason.
In reviewing cases that precedent does not directly
control, she is skeptical of both highly abstract arguments and
highly comprehensive courses of action; she keeps her eye on
the practical consequences of the Court's decisions and expects
litigants to do the same. When an Indian tribe insisted on
reading a contractual waiver clause very narrowly to preserve
its immunity, Ginsburg reminded the tribe that "the contract's
dispute resolution regime . . .has a real world objective; it is
not designed for regulation of a game lacking practical
consequences."89 And when the state of Georgia mandated drug
tests for all candidates for state office, she noted the lack of
"any indication of a concrete danger" to support the sweeping
For an examination of Ginsburg's views on stare decisis and her practice
during her first Term on the Court, see Mei-Fei Kuo & Kai Wang, When is an
Innovation in Order?: Justice Ruth [Bader] Ginsburg and Stare Decisis, 20 U. HAW. L.
REV. 835 (1998). See also Joyce Ann Baugh et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A
Preliminary Assessment, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 1 (1994).
87 Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 186 (1999).
Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 2443 (2002) (quoting Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989)).
89 C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma,
532 U.S. 411, 422 (2001).
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policy.' Georgia's testing scheme, she concluded, "diminishes
personal privacy for a symbol's sake."9
Ginsburg applies a similarly pragmatic standard to the
lower courts, which play a major role in her decisionmaking
model. For example, in Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, she was troubled when both the district court and the
court of appeals declined to certify an issue of state
constitutional law to the Arizona Supreme Court for resolution.
Offering what is for Ginsburg a serious rebuke, she observed
that "[a] more cautious approach was in order" to conserve
judicial resources and promote "judicial federalism."9" Caution,
like moderation, is a value central to her jurisprudence. In this
case, that value overlaps with the value of collegiality: Just as
appellate judges should respect one another and work in
harmonious collaboration, so judges of one court should respect
the authority of judges of another court, whether within the
federal or a state judicial system. Ginsburg's own opinions
express that respect through their detailed exposition of the
positions held by the lower courts, especially those of the
federal courts of appeals. It is a mark of respect to those judges,
even when they are about to be reversed, that their opinions
are consistently treated seriously and never dismissed as
incompetent or untenable.
Ginsburg's commitment to mutual respect among
members of the bench does not, however, preclude her from
criticizing her colleagues' conclusions. Although her earliest
Supreme Court opinions demonstrated little interest in calling
other Justices to task, her approach gradually relaxed to
permit some mildly acerbic rejoinders. In a 1998 opinion
dealing with the Full Faith and Credit Clause implications of a
lower court's preclusive order, Ginsburg, the former civil
procedure scholar, clearly felt herself on familiar ground.93
Although the decision was unanimous, she nevertheless chided
Justice Kennedy, whose opinion, concurring in the judgment,
90 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997). In a recent opinion, Ginsburg
again rejected a litigant's position "because we doubt that the supporting scenario is
likely to occur outside the realm of theory." TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 539 U.S. 19, 26
(2001). See also Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 366 (2002) (quoting Osborne v. Ohio, 495
U.S. 103, 124 (1990) (noting that petitioner's "right to defend should not depend on a
formal 'ritual... [that] would further no perceivable state interest'")).
91 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322.
92 Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 77 (1997).
93 This is the case mentioned supra note 73, in which she cites her own law
review article.
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garnered two votes, for "emphasiz[ing] the obvious" in rejecting
preclusion against nonparties.94
Ginsburg took a stronger tone against Chief Justice
Rehnquist when he dissented from her opinion in Buckley v.
American Constitutional Law Foundation,95 where the Court
held an Ohio statute imposing disclosure requirements on
initiative-petition circulators to be in violation of the First
Amendment. She dismissed as "imaginary" the concern
expressed in Rehnquist's solitary dissent that the Court's
holding would make convicted drug dealers, children and
noncitizens eligible to circulate initiative petitions and quoted a
former colleague on the appeals court, Robert Bork, in support
of her skepticism: "This familiar parade of dreadfuls calls to
mind wise counsel: 'Judges and lawyers live on the slippery
slope of analogies; they are not supposed to ski it to the
bottom.' 96 The quoted passage is particularly resonant, coming
as it does from the celebrated conservative and, more
particularly, from his book attacking the confirmation process
that denied him a seat on the Supreme Court. Ginsburg called
on one conservative voice to reproach another for excess; she
also demonstrated that she was comfortable drawing on the
work of a highly ideological former colleague when it made her
point with wit and common sense. Significantly, in this passage
Ginsburg criticized Rehnquist's method of argument. In
criticizing other dissenters, she has usually confined herself to
characterizing their positions as "puzzling"97 or "to say the
least, extravagant."98 Her good humored rebuke of Rehnquist's
method, bolstered by an authority he was likely to respect,
reflected her own belief that how a judge approaches a case
may be more important than the opinion's substance.
As a writer, Ginsburg values clarity above elegance. She
has explained that she greatly admires the second Justice
Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 237 n.11 (1998). Kennedy's
opinion was joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas. Id. at 243.
95 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
"6 Id. at 194 n. 16 (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 169 (1990)).
9' Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 409 n.4 (2000). The opinion Ginsburg
is responding to was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who concurred in part and
dissented in part. Id. at 422.
98 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 188
n.4 (2000). The dissenter was Justice Scalia. Id. at 198. For a sharper characterization
of a dissent, delivered in the form of a metaphor, see Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 385




Harlan's manner of opinion writing because "he always told us
his reasoning-he never hid it; it was always spelled out with
great clarity."99 Her insistence on clarity in her own writing
means that she "will often read a sentence aloud and consider,
'Can I say this in fewer words-can I write it so that the
meaning will come across with greater clarity?"""0
Ginsburg's preference for clarity distinguishes her
judicial style. Her opinions for the Court are so consistently
moderate in tone that they rarely offer the reader any language
distinctive enough to identify her at once as the author. She
does, however, favor a few locutions that appear with sufficient
regularity to become familiar markers. One such term is to
"home in on," used figuratively as to seek out or focus on. Thus,
a litigant did not "home in on" a particular contention in its
petition for certiorari,' and the Court itself prepared to "home
in on" the central question. 2 Ginsburg also repeatedly uses the
adjective "pathmarking" as a shorthand way of identifying
important precedents and insisting on their critical role in
guiding Court decisions. In resolving a tax challenge by an
Indian tribe, she "placed in clear view a pathmarking
decision," 3 and in the VMI case she cited "this Court's
pathmarking decisions" in earlier gender discrimination
cases.' °4 Ginsburg has revived another distinctive expression,
"mine run," used in place of the more usual "run of the mill" for
something ordinary or unexceptional, as in "mine run civil
actions""5 or "the mine run of procedural rules;"' 6 she also
occasionally uses a variant form, referring in one opinion to
"run-of-the-mine, ordinarily nondispositive, evidentiary
rulings."' 7 Ginsburg occasionally will use a term that has a
9 HEARINGS AND REPORTS, supra note 1, at 378.
'0o Quoted in Friedman, supra note 59, at 12.
101 Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 400 n.7 (1996).
102 Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 70 (1996). See also UNUM Life Ins.
Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 368 (1999) (stating that regulation "homes in on the
insurance industry"); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997) (noting
that the court "homed in on settlement terms"); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S.
642, 670 (1997) (finding that the Eighth Circuit "homed in on the essence of §14(e)'s
rulemaking authorization").
103 Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 523 U. S. 696, 714 (1998).
114 United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). See also Strate
v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997) ("the pathmarking case concerning tribal
civil authority over nonmembers"); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 124 n.14 (1996)
("[tihe pathmarking voting and ballot access decisions").
105 M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 127. See also id. at 123 ("the mine run of cases").
106 Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 387 (2002).
107 Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 452 n.9 (2000). Justices other than
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slightly antiquated flavor, as when statutory language
"bespeaks a deliberate legislative choice.""8 At one moment she
may select a surprisingly formal word, like "crystalline"'0 9 or
"incantation,""' while at another she uses an informal
expression, like "hook, line, and sinker.""' This variety in
diction suggests a sensitivity to language not surprising in
someone who studied with Vladimir Nabokov in college and
remembered that he loved "the sound of words.""2
Ginsburg's occasional use of literary allusions illustrates
her interest in style. Her majority opinions contain three
unidentified allusions to Shakespeare. She twice borrowed
Polonius's simile for inevitability that "it must follow, as the
night the day,""' both times using it to reject the logic of a
proffered theory. She cited it once to counter the argument that
evidence of occasional fraud means that "paid petition
circulators are likelier to commit fraud than volunteers, "  and
again to reject an insistence on reading two instances of the
same statutory language in precisely the same way.15 In
Ginsburg seldom have used the term "mine run." See Sumner v. Mata, 446 U.S. 1302
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., Circuit Justice) (referring to "the numerous mine-run decisions
on the reliability of identification"); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 222 (1961)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that issue is not "merely a mine-run statutory
question"). The term means "a product of common or average grade." WEBSTER'S THIRD
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1438 (3d ed. 1993). In its
longer form, "run-of-the-mine," the term has been used with some frequency by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and less often by Justice Scalia. See, e.g., Rubin v. United States,
524 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J.) ("This case is obviously not a run-of-the-
mine dispute."); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 786 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring and dissenting) ("run-of-the-mine labor picketing"). In the 1940s and 1950s,
the term was used by a number of Justices. See, e.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S.
121, 126 (1954) (Clark, J.) ("run-of-the-mine cases"); Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15, 28 n.19 (1953) (Reed, J.) ("run-of-the-mine accidents"); Baltimore & Ohio R.R.
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 146, 148 (1958) (Black, J.) ("run-of-mine regulations");
United States v. Scophony Corp. of Am., 333 U.S. 795, 814 n.26 (1948) (Rutledge, J.)
("run-of-the-mine casual or intermittent sales of commodities").
100 Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of
California, 522 U.S. 192, 205 (1997).
log Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 63 (1998) (noting that "[t]he exposition
in the Tinker opinion is less than crystalline").
'10 Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 469 (2000) (noting that a legal
"principle does not demand the incantation of particular words").
" Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 666 (1996) (noting that "[the
dissent adopts this argument hook, line, and sinker").
1 Friedman, supra note 59, at 12.
n3 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK
act 1, sc. 3, 11. 83-85. In the passage, Polonius advises his son, Laertes: "This above all:
to thine ownself be true, And it must follow, as the night the day, Thou canst not then
be false to any man." Id.
114 Buckley v. Am. Constitutional L. Found., 525 U.S. 182, 204 n.23 (1999).
"1 United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 212 (2001)
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another opinion, she referred to a litigant's "'all's well that ends
well' approach.""' She did not attribute these Shakespearean
references to the author, since all are expressions that have
passed into common usage. The single literary source that
Ginsburg did identify is from the trial of the Knave of Hearts in
Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland."7 After criticizing the
treatment of a litigant, she referred to procedural systems "real
and imaginary, less concerned than ours with the right to due
process."'18 Her example of such a system, quoted at length in a
footnote, is the Knave's celebrated trial, where the White
Rabbit, serving as herald, interrupts the King who is about to
send the case to the jury before the introduction of any
evidence." 9 Ginsburg is the first Justice to offer Carroll's trial
as the perfect antithesis of due process.'2 0
Ginsburg's occasional use of metaphor to sharpen a
point further illustrates the literary strain in her opinions.
("We do not agree that the latter follows from the former like the night, the day.").
116 Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 74 (1996). See WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, ALL'S WELL THAT ENDS WELL. Ginsburg's interest in Shakespeare
appears in other contexts as well. For a quotation from Othello, see Ginsburg,
Communicating and Commenting, supra note 23, at 2126. Ginsburg also made a cameo
appearance at the Shakespeare Theatre in Washington, D.C. See Elaine Sciolino, Lear
Gets a Break From Supreme Court Justices Who Think the Play's the Thing, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2001, at B19.
117 LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND (Donald J. Gray ed., 1971).
118 Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 468 (2000).
119 A well-known work offers this example:
"Herald, read the accusation!" said the King.
On this the White Rabbit blew three blasts on the trumpet, and then
unrolled the parchment scroll, and read as follows:
"The Queen of Hearts, she made some tarts,
All on a summer day: The Knave of Hearts, he stole those tarts,
And took them quite away!"
"Consider your verdict," the King said to the jury.
"Not yet, not yet!" the Rabbit interrupted. "There's a great deal to come
before that!"
LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 108
(Messner, 1982), quoted in Nelson, 529 U.S. at 468 n.2.
120 Other Justices have cited Alice, but usually to refer generally to illogical or
bizarre interpretations or events. See, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 705
(2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the Court's "Alice in Wonderland
determination that there are such things as judicially determinable 'essential' and
'nonessential' rules of a made-up game"); United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839,
928-29 (1996) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (finding that "[sluch a result has an Alice in
Wonderland aspect to it"). Justice Ginsburg joined the Rehnquist dissent in Winstar. In
her opinion for the Court in a recent case, Ginsburg quoted with approval a passage
from an Eighth Circuit dissent which made use of Alice (Eighth Circuit dissenter
stating that insistence on a written motion for continuance during trial "would be so
bizarre as to inject an Alice-in-Wonderland quality into the proceedings."). Lee v.
Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 383 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting
Lee v. Kemna, 213 F.3d 1037, 1047 (8th Cir. 2000) (Bennett, J., dissenting)).
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Some metaphors, like "the lion's share"121 or "one more arrow in
its quiver," "' are little more than familiar expressions that
have lost much of their figurative impact. In a few instances,
however, Ginsburg develops her own metaphors to achieve
stronger effects. Speaking of a custodial interrogation governed
by the Miranda rules, she used a theatrical metaphor: "Once
the scene is set and the players' lines and actions are
reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve
'the ultimate inquiry.""23 The literary analogy indicates the
proper judicial detachment with which emotionally provocative
cases should be analyzed. When the Court addressed the
copyright infringement claims of authors whose articles were
included in large electronic databases, Ginsburg again
employed a literary metaphor as part of her insistence that
such inclusion is not "revision" for purposes of the copyright
statute: "The Database no more constitutes a 'revision' of each
constituent edition than a 400-page novel quoting a sonnet in
passing would represent a 'revision' of that poem." 24 By
analogizing a freelance article to a sonnet, Ginsburg gave it the
dignity of a valid and independent piece of writing, thus
supporting the statutory rights of the article authors.
Ginsburg's most original and elaborate metaphor,
appropriately enough, describes a procedural rule determining
the authority of state court judges to review damages awards
under the Seventh Amendment. In a footnote responding to
Justice Scalia's dissent, Ginsburg compared his proposed rule
to a peculiarly constructed creature: "The sphinx-like, damage-
determining law he would apply to this controversy has a state
forepart, but a federal hindquarter. The beast may not be
brutish, but there is little judgment in its creation."025 The beast
offends Ginsburg's preference for clarity and rationality in the
law, even among the complexities of Erie doctrine. This
unusually vivid image echoes one of Shakespeare's most
familiar passages, Antony's funeral oration for Julius Caesar,
in which Antony also links the loss of judgment with a
"brutish" loss of reason: "0 judgment, thou art fled to brutish
beasts, And men have lost their reason!"'26 In spite of her
121 Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 22 (2000).
"' United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 212 (2001).
123 Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
12' New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 500 (2001).
126 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 438 n.23 (1996).
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act 3, sc. 2, 11. 119-20. Like
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collegiality principle, which counsels toleration for the
dissenter's views, in this instance she found Scalia's hybrid
proposal sufficiently bizarre to warrant the oblique but potent
criticism of her extended metaphor, a criticism only somewhat
muted by its placement in a footnote.
III. WRITING IN DISSENT
As a circuit court judge, Ginsburg observed that "United
States appellate judges might profitably exercise greater
restraint before writing separately."'27 One might, therefore,
have expected her to follow her own advice after joining the
Supreme Court. Her record as a dissenter, however, does not
quite match her theory of collegial restraint. In nine Terms on
the Court, she has written forty-nine dissents, with the tally
per Term ranging from a low of three to a high of eight
dissents.'28 Those numbers place her slightly below the Court's
average in every Term but one-surprisingly her first Term-
when she wrote eight dissents, more than any of her colleagues
except Justices Stevens, Blackmun and Thomas.'29 Although
she has never come close to matching Stevens's record of
twenty-one dissents, she has also never matched Kennedy's
record of a single dissent.'
Ginsburg's other Shakespearean allusions, this reference is not made explicit and may
reflect a general sense of the passage rather than a deliberate paraphrase.
127 Ginsburg, Writing Separately, supra note 6, at 134.
See supra note 44.
129 Stevens wrote thirteen dissents, Blackmun eleven, and Thomas nine.
These figures are based on the Harvard Law Review's annual statistical summary of
the Court's Term. The average number of dissents for the years of Ginsburg's tenure
has remained in a narrow range, from 7.1 to 7.4. The following table lists Ginsburg's
record of dissent, omitting (as did the Harvard Law Review) two very brief dissents
from denials of stays of execution. Computations of averages by the author based on
data from the Harvard Law Review annual statistical studies, supra note 44.










130 Stevens wrote twenty-one dissents in the 1995 Term; Kennedy wrote only
one dissent in the 1993 Term.
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Ginsburg has been a moderate dissenter, willing to voice
her disagreement with the majority on a regular basis and
unwilling to embrace consensus at any cost. Like Justice
Brennan, whose defense of dissent she has cited with approval,
Ginsburg recognizes that the act of dissenting is not a betrayal
of institutional values."' Rather, it is an essential part of a
Justice's role, an occasion when, in her terms, the tug of
individuality properly defeats the rival tug of collegiality.
Ginsburg has responded most directly to that tug of
individuality by filing thirteen solitary dissents.3 ' In fourteen
of her dissents, however, she has been joined by a coalition of
Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer.'33 Of her remaining
colleagues, only Justice Thomas has never joined a Ginsburg
dissent.'
The most interesting question is not how often Ginsburg
dissents or who joins her but what concerns prompt her to
write separately. The body of her dissenting opinions suggests
that her principles of moderation, way paving and collegiality
continue to guide her. She is, for example, likely to object when
she believes that the majority has reached an unnecessarily
sweeping result, disregarded binding precedent or failed to
accord appropriate respect to another court or another branch
of government. Several of her dissents focus on institutional
concerns: how the Court should respond to the claims of an
unscrupulous litigant or how consensus may be derived from
apparently divergent positions. She does not use her dissents to
express her indignation at the follies of her colleagues in the
manner of Justice Scalia'3' or to lament her own inability to
13' Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 10, at 1194. Brennan argues that the
dissenting opinion serves a number of valuable functions on a collegial court. It
identifies errors in the majority opinion, keeps the majority accountable, serves as a
'damage control' mechanism" when a majority opinion is unnecessarily broad, and
offers litigants guidance concerning alternate ways of securing relief. Brennan, supra
note 17, at 430. According to Brennan, the dissent "is not an egoistic act-it is duty." Id.
at 438.
132 For statistical purposes, I follow the Harvard Law Review in counting
opinions dissenting in part and concurring in part as dissents.
133 This figure includes dissents which members of the coalition joined only in
part; Souter and Breyer each joined in part on two occasions.
134 Chief Justice Rehnquist has joined five Ginsburg dissents, Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor two, and Justice Scalia one.
135 Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Personality: Rhetoric and Emotion in
Supreme Court Opinions, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 193, 227 (2002). See, e.g., Scalia's
characterization of the majority in Romer v. Evans as having "mistaken a Kulturkampf
for a fit of spite." 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ensure a just result in the manner of Justice Blackmun.136 She
has not been tempted, even by some of the Court's high profile
cases, to deliver what she has called "spicy" dissents,'37 which
relieve the author's emotions by attacking her colleagues. In
defeat as in victory, she remains a voice of moderation and
restraint.
Ginsburg's strong regard for precedent, a recurring
theme of her jurisprudence, leads her to dissent if she believes
that the majority is misusing prior decisions. When the Court
found no Sixth Amendment violation in a prosecutor's
comments on the defendant's ability to make use of prior
witnesses in shaping his own testimony, Ginsburg complained
that the majority was improperly attempting to
constitutionalize one precedent "by yoking it" to another."8 In a
bankruptcy case, she also complained that the Court was
evading its own precedent by engaging in "an end-run around
the filed rate doctrine so recently and firmly upheld."'39 Such
evasion, she argued, was the wrong way to deal with an
uncomfortable precedent: "[T]he way to correct that error, if
error it was, is to overrule the unsatisfactory precedent, not to
feign fidelity to it while avoiding its essential meaning."'4 °
Precedent is not an absolute for Ginsburg;' it may be altered
or abandoned, as long as the Court is forthright in its
approach. If the Court is usually obligated to follow precedent,
it is also obligated to create precedent when there is no
governing case law. After joining a dissent by Justice Stevens
136 Ray, supra note 135, at 232-33. See, e.g., Blackmun's opinion in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey observing that "I am 83 years old. I
cannot remain on this Court forever." 505 U.S. 833, 943 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
137 Ginsburg, Styles of Collegial Judging, supra note 21, at 201.
138 Portuando v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 81 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
139 Sec. Servs., Inc. v. KMart Corp., 511 U.S. 431, 458 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
140 Id.
1 See, e.g., Gray v. J.D. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 183 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "Teague is not the straitjacket the Commonwealth
misunderstands it to be"). Ginsburg recently dissented from the Court's denial of
certiorari in a case raising the issue of capital punishment as the sentence for a crime
committed by someone under the age of eighteen on the ground that a 2002 decision by
the Court changing its position on the execution of mentally retarded criminals had
"made it tenable for the petitioner to urge reconsideration" of a 1989 precedent.
Patterson v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 24, 24 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Noting that "I
think it appropriate to revisit the issue at this time," she relied on the reasons provided
by Justice Stevens in his dissent, which cited the "apparent consensus that exists
among the States and in the international community against the execution of a capital
sentence imposed on a juvenile offender." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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in a teacher-student harassment case, Ginsburg added a
separate dissent to insist that the Court should have resolved
an issue reserved by Stevens because "this Court's
pathmarkers are needed to afford guidance to lower courts and
school officials."'42 It is the Court's responsibility both to create
and to follow precedent, and Ginsburg protests when the Court
fails to do either.
Ginsburg's respect for precedent, though strong, is not
rigid. She recognizes that the application of precedent to a new
factual setting is not a mechanical process, and she has
dissented vigorously when she finds that the Court has failed
to acknowledge significant distinctions between a precedent
and a new set of facts. A recent case on school drug testing,
Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of
Pottawatomie County v. Earls,' offers a vivid illustration. In
Pottawatomie, the Court relied on its earlier decision in
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton' to uphold a school
policy of random drug tests for all students engaged in
extracurricular activities. Ginsburg's dissent systematically
undermined the relevance of Vernonia, which dealt with a
drug-testing plan for student athletes, to the later case; she
pointed to the lack of a serious drug problem at the
Pottawatomie school, the significant risks of physical injury
incident to athletic competition, the differing privacy
expectations of athletes and chorus members, and other factual
distinctions.'45 Her larger point was that the Court had read its
precedent incorrectly, "cut[ting] out an element essential to the
Vernonia judgment,"'46 and otherwise failed to provide a
nuanced reading of its own decision. She reserved her direct
irony for the federal government's amicus brief, which argued
that students engaged in homemaking activities, farming
programs and band risk physical injuries similar to those of
athletes. "Notwithstanding nightmarish images of out-of-
control flatware, livestock run amok, and colliding tubas," she
noted, most students subject to the plan under review "are not
safety sensitive to an unusual degree."'47 That commonsensical
14' Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 307 (1998) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
143 122 S.Ct. 2559 (2002).
14 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
145 Pottawatomie County, 122 S.Ct. at 2574-75 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 2576.
147 Id. at 2577.
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attitude also extended to the majority, which she suggested
had made a disproportionate response to circumstances far less
dangerous than those in Vernonia and, thus, permitted the
school district to violate rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment. Precedent controls, but only when it clearly
matches the particular factual situation before the Court.
Although Ginsburg's regard for precedent is flexible
enough to accommodate change as well as variation, she tends
to prefer incremental rather than dramatic transformations of
the law and to require substantial support for significant
doctrinal developments. Thus, it is not surprising that she has
dissented when she thinks that the majority is striking out
unwisely in a new direction. Responding to a decision that
permitted federal courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over state administrative agency actions, Ginsburg the
proceduralist described the majority's holding as "a watershed
opinion,"'48 but one that ignored substantial authority to the
contrary. Her analysis began with a simple statement of that
authority: "I catalog first the decisions, in addition to the
Seventh Circuit's, that the Court today overrides."149 The
lengthy paragraph that followed, listing the holdings of eight
circuit court opinions, provided a visual expression of the
weight of authority that the Court rejected. The passage
conveyed a secondary theme as well: the Court's lack of respect
for this broad consensus. Although the Court was not bound by
these lower court holdings, she considered it unwise to reject
them.
Ginsburg has also resisted doctrinal change when she
thought that the Court was substituting its policy preferences
for those of Congress. In a case interpreting a securities
statute, she found the Court's reliance on "impressive policy
reasons" inadequate to overcome the substantial "drafting
history and the longstanding scholarly and judicial
understanding"" ° of the statute in question. She would,
therefore, "leave any alteration to Congress.""' This deference
to the legislative branch reflects Ginsburg's view of the
coordinate branches of the federal government as the Court's
141 City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 175 (1997)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 178.
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colleagues and, therefore, deserving of respect. Faced with a
long-standing judicial interpretation based on legislative
history, she declined to accept a new policy, however strong the
Court's argument, until Congress expressed its intention of
making the change.
Ginsburg's preference for gradual change leads her to
dissent when she believes that the Court has moved too
quickly. A Fourth Amendment case, Arizona v. Evans,
152
illustrates this preference. The defendant was charged with
possession of marijuana after a search of his car based on an
outstanding arrest warrant; in fact, a Justice of the Peace had
quashed the warrant prior to the arrest, but that information
had not been properly entered into the computer records of the
Sheriffs Office. Responding to the defendant's motion to
suppress, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply to clerical
errors in maintaining accurate computer records; the United
States Supreme Court reversed. Ginsburg approached the case
as an example of "an evolving problem this Court need not, and
in my judgment should not, resolve too hastily."'53 Such new
legal issues, including those based on the increasing use of
computer technology in law enforcement, were "frontier legal
problems" that would benefit from "percolation," the
opportunity for lower state and federal courts to address the
issue and perhaps "yield a better informed and more enduring
final pronouncement by this Court.""4 Ginsburg was careful to
note that she took no position on the substance of relevant
federal precedents;"5  her objection was to the Court's
unnecessary haste in resolving an issue that she viewed as
essentially "empirical" and therefore likely to benefit from
Justice Brandeis's perception of the states as laboratories
experimenting with a range of solutions."6
Although Ginsburg asserted her neutrality on the
substantive issue before the Court in Arizona v. Evans,"' she
reached a similar conclusion in a case where she held strong
views about the subject matter. In Missouri v. Jenkins,"8 the
152 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
Id. at 23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
"4 Id. at 23 n.1.
" Id. at 29.
1 Id. at 30.
57 514 U.S. 1.
"4 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
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Court by a five to four vote found that orders issued under a
school desegregation decree exceeded the district court's
remedial authority over the Kansas City School District.
Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent but also wrote
separately to emphasize the basis for her view that the Court
was acting too hastily in terminating the desegregation effort.
In a capsule history beginning with the issuance of a slave code
by France in 1724, she traced the difficult progress toward
desegregation in Missouri through Brown v. Board of
Education5 ' and post-Brown remedial orders. "Given the deep,
inglorious history of segregation in Missouri," she concluded,
"to curtail desegregation at this time and in this manner is an
action at once too swift and too soon." 6' The caution invoked in
Jenkins is grounded not in the need for further
experimentation but in the certainty that immediate action will
block further progress. Both cases, however, reflect Ginsburg's
deeply ingrained distaste for what she considers precipitate
action.16'
Ginsburg also identifies other methodological errors in
majority opinions that disturb her sense of the importance of
the way in which opinions are written. In one case, she
criticized the Court's "divide and conquer"'62 strategy employed
to reformulate and distort a litigant's position: "The Court first
slices [petitioner's] whole claim into pieces; it then deals
discretely with each segment."'63 When the Court in an ERISA
case attributed to Congress an intention to invoke fine
distinctions drawn from the history of equity jurisprudence,
Ginsburg found the approach "fanciful."64 Viewing the statute
from a commonsensical perspective, she found it obvious that
"[t]he rarefied rules underlying this rigid and time-bound
conception of the term 'equity' were hardly at the fingertips of
those who enacted § 502(a)(3).""6 5 Ginsburg also objected to the
159 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
160 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 176.
161 In Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000),
Ginsburg identified a third basis for dissenting from the majority's undue haste in
upholding an arbitration agreement. She argued that "the Court has reached out
prematurely to resolve the matter in the lender's favor" and noted that she "would
remand for clarification of Green Tree's practice." Id. at 96 (Ginsburg, J. concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
162 Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 181 (1996).
163 Id.
'64 Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 225 (2002)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1 Id. at 224.
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Court's expansive holding in a Fourth Amendment case
limiting the legitimate expectations of privacy of guests. 66 She
would have confined the decision to the case's distinct factual
situation and "would not reach classroom hypotheticals like the
milkman or the pizza deliverer."'67 All of these cases reflect her
insistence on caution and practicality in the decisionmaking
process.
There is a paradoxical quality to the dissenting opinions
in which Ginsburg finds the members of the majority to lack
proper respect for their judicial and legislative colleagues. As
Chief Justice Hughes observed, the dissenter is a "free lance"
who operates without the constraints imposed by the majority
author's need to accommodate the views of other Justices.'68 For
Ginsburg, the impetus to a dissent is often her perception that
the Court has failed to accord due respect to the decisions of
lower courts. Thus, she departs from her own prescription for
collegiality in order to defend it. Ginsburg expresses her
respect for lower federal court judges in several ways. She may
quote extensively from a lower court opinion that she finds
more accurate than the Court's opinion, a strategy she used in
concluding an early dissent with the language in which the
circuit court judge under review "persuasively explained" the
proper resolution of the case.'69 She may insist that circuit
judges be paid their due: "When this Court rejects the
considered judgment prevailing in the Circuits, respect for our
colleagues demands a cogent explanation."70 She may also
insist that circuit court judges be given the first opportunity to
rule on a new issue, as she did in criticizing the Court for
"speak[ing] the first word on the content of Delaware
preclusion law."' 7' Ginsburg affords similar respect to state
166 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
16' Id. at 107. Ginsburg cited with disapproval a hypothetical in Justice
Kennedy's concurrence-"a stop of a minute or two at the 19th of 20 homes to drop off a
packet"-as presenting circumstances "which scarcely resemble" the case's stipulated
facts. Id. at 109 n.2.
1'8 According to Hughes, "[d]issenting opinions enable a judge to express his
individuality. He is not under the compulsion of speaking for the court and thus of
securing the concurrence of a majority. In dissenting, he is a free lance." CHARLES
EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928).
169 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 686 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
70 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep't of Health and
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 643-44 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
171 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 388 (1996)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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court judges whose decisions come before the Court, and she
has chided her colleagues when she believes that the majority
"unnecessarily and unwisely ventures into territory
traditionally within the States' domain" by finding an award of
punitive damages grossly excessive.17
Ginsburg's thirteen year career as a circuit court judge
certainly contributes to her sense that lower court judges,
particularly those on the appellate bench, may on occasion be
better situated than Supreme Court Justices to resolve a case.
Dissenting from the decision vacating a stay of execution
issued by the Eighth Circuit, Ginsburg objected to the Court's
refusal to seek clarification of the lower court's order:
"Appreciation of our own fallibility, and respect for the
judgment of an appellate tribunal closer to the scene than we
are, as I see it, demand as much."'73 There are two strands to
her objection. One is the conventional notion that judges closer
to the litigation have a unique perspective that the Court
should value. The second strand is the more subversive notion
that the Court should retain a measure of skepticism
concerning its own abilities. Echoing Justice Jackson's famous
epigram that "[w]e are not final because we are infallible, but
we are infallible only because we are final,"1"4 Ginsburg gently
reminds her fellow Justices that even they may commit errors.
She suggests that one further aspect of collegiality is the
responsibility of each Justice to help her colleagues to
remember their shared limitations and to recognize the
assistance available to them.
A variation on the theme of collegiality dominates what
is probably the most widely read of Ginsburg's dissents, her
opinion in Bush v. Gore. 7' Ginsburg's principal objection to the
majority opinion was its refusal to honor the decision of the
Florida Supreme Court interpreting state election law to
permit a recount. She reminded the Court that, even when
state law issues affect federal law, "we have dealt with such
cases ever mindful of the full measure of respect we owe to
interpretations of state law by a State's highest court."7 6 More
172 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 607 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Ginsburg found that "[t]he respect due the Alabama Supreme Court
requires that we strip from this case a false issue." Id.
173 Bowersox v. Williams, 517 U.S. 345, 347 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
174 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
175 531 U.S. 98, 135 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
176 Id. at 137.
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specifically, Ginsburg bristled at the majority's linkage of the
Florida decision with a handful of state supreme court cases in
which the Court rejected interpretations of state law that
blocked the exercise of federal constitutional rights.177 Those
cases were decided by state supreme courts intent on using
state law as a weapon to disadvantage litigants engaged in the
civil rights struggle. In contrast, she found that the Florida
Supreme Court had provided a responsible and credible
reading of state election law and "surely should not be
bracketed with state high courts of the Jim Crow South." 8 The
imputation, never quite articulated, is that the majority is
accusing the Florida court of twisting the law to produce a
politically desirable result. Ginsburg rejected the majority's
overt accusation of judicial legislation and offered a firm
defense: "There is no cause here to believe that the members of
Florida's high court have done less than 'their mortal best to
discharge their oath of office,' . .. and no cause to upset their
reasoned interpretation of Florida law."179
Ginsburg staked out a delicate position, championing
the Florida judges as responsible jurists while at the same time
refraining from the kind of harsh attack on the majority that
she elsewhere deplores. In the opening paragraph of her
dissent, she referred to "[m]y colleagues" in the majority and
even suggested that she might have joined Rehnquist's position
"were it my commission to interpret Florida law."8 ' Along with
these collegial gestures, however, she also allowed herself a
pointed reference to the surprising alignment of the Justices
usually vocal in their defense of state prerogatives, though she
stopped short of accusing them of flagrant hypocrisy: "Were the
other Members of this Court as mindful as they generally are of
our system of dual sovereignty, they would affirm the judgment
of the Florida Supreme Court." 8' In the final section of the
opinion, she again defended "the good faith and diligence" of
Florida judges and officials against the majority's prediction
that there was insufficient time for judicial review of a
recount.1 82 That conclusion, she noted, was "an untested
prophecy [that] should not decide the Presidency of the United
'" Id. at 139-41.
178 Id. at 141.
'7' Id. at 136.
180 Bush, 531 U.S. at 136.




States."8 ' Ginsburg barely succeeded in her difficult task of
defending one set of colleagues without attacking another, and
some readers noted with interest that the final sentence of her
opinion, "I dissent," omitted the adverb "respectfully."18 4  In
fact, Ginsburg has very seldom used the formula "I respectfully
dissent" to end an opinion,'85 but its absence here may reflect
the sharper than usual criticism of her colleagues detectable
beneath the surface of the opinion.
If Ginsburg's dissent in Bush v. Gore emphasized her
belief in the collegial relationship that should exist between
judges of different judicial systems, her dissent in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena86 emphasized the ties between
members of the Court even when they appeared to be deeply
divided. Adarand, the Court's most recent affirmative action
decision, imposed strict scrutiny as the standard for analyzing
all racial classifications, including those favoring racial
minorities. The Court, divided five to four, barely managed to
produce a majority opinion by Justice O'Connor;"7 two Justices
wrote opinions concurring only in part, and three wrote
dissents. '88 The dissenters argued vigorously that benign racial
classifications should be subject to a less rigorous standard,
though they disagreed among themselves as to the rationale for
that distinction. From this welter of views, Ginsburg in dissent
attempted to create a measure of consensus. Although she
joined the dissents by Justices Stevens and Souter, she had an
original point to make in her own opinion: "I write separately
to underscore not the differences the several opinions in this
case display, but the considerable field of agreement-the
common understandings and concerns-revealed in opinions
183 Id.
184 Id.
5 1 have identified only four opinions that use the formula, all of them earlier
than Bush v. Gore. See United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 701 (1998) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Gray v. J.D. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 171 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 488 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Sec.
Servs., Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 511 U.S. 431, 455 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
18 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
187 All but one section of Justice O'Connor's opinion was designated as "for the
Court," subject to a strict qualification that it was "for the Court except insofar as it
might be inconsistent with the views expressed in Justice Scalia's concurrence." Id. at
204.
'" See id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
id. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 264 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 271
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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that together speak for a majority of the Court."189 Ginsburg
argued that a majority of Justices called for strict scrutiny to
identify malign classifications "masquerading as benign," not to
eliminate all race-conscious government programs. 9 ° This
reading allowed her to accept the Court's decision as something
less than a defeat for proponents of affirmative action, more
precisely "as one that allows our precedent to evolve, still to be
informed by and responsive to changing conditions." 9' The
effort to find consensus in such a divisive case-and to use a
dissenting opinion to do so-reflects Ginsburg's powerful
response to both the issue of racial justice and the tug of
collegiality. In his nominating speech, President Clinton
described Ginsburg as a "force for consensus-building on the
Supreme Court."'92 Her opinion in Adarand is little short of
heroic in its determination to find some common ground on this
difficult issue and to keep open the line of doctrinal
development.
Other varieties of institutional concern also prompt
Ginsburg to dissent. When the Court in Miller v. Johnson9'
established a new standard for legislative districts prohibiting
the use of race as the dominant factor, she characterized that
decision as "a counterforce." 94 It would, she argued, expand the
judicial role by drawing "[flederal judges in large numbers ...
into the fray"99 and make the redistricting process "perilous
work for state legislators."'96 This was, in her view, the
antithesis of the Court's appropriate tasks of avoiding self-
aggrandizement and showing respect for the work of other
government branches.
The possibility that an unscrupulous litigant had
manipulated the Court into reviewing a claim not raised below
also prompted a dissent. With surprisingly vivid imagery, she
accused the petitioner, a landowner, of executing a "bait-and-
switch ploy"'97 and "mov[ing] the pea to a different shell"198 in
'89 Id. at 271 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1 0 Id. at 275.
191 Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 276.
192 HEARINGS AND REPORTS, supra note 1, at 10.
193 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
194 Id. at 949 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 648 (2001) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
198 Id. at 652.
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his efforts to evade a state supreme court ruling that his
takings claim was not ripe. Her concern went beyond mere
pique at the petitioner's conduct to concern for the implications
of the Court's gullibility: "This Court's waiver ruling thus
amounts to an unsavory invitation to unscrupulous litigants:
Change your theory and misrepresent the record in your
petition for certiorari; if the respondent fails to note your
machinations, you have created a different record on which this
Court will review the case."'99
Her proceduralist's distaste for misuse of rules appeared
most vividly in Agostini v. Felton,2°° where the Court agreed to
revisit a twelve-year-old Establishment Clause precedent based
on a Rule 60(b)(5) motion for relief from judgment.2"' Since, as a
matter of procedure, Rule 60(b)(5) does not permit relitigation
of underlying claims, she accused the majority of bending the
rule "to a purpose-allowing an 'anytime' rehearing" rather
than awaiting a more suitable vehicle raising the same issue."2
She spelled out the basis for her objection by explaining the
"just cause" she found for denying review: "That cause lies in
the maintenance of integrity in the interpretation of procedural
rules, preservation of the responsive, non-agenda-setting
character of this Court, and avoidance of invitations to
reconsider old cases based on 'speculat[ions] on chances from
changes in [the Court's membership] .,,,203 Fidelity to procedural
rules was more than a matter of fastidious nitpicking.
Ginsburg expressly linked it to the crucial institutional
responsibility for preserving the Court's stature as an
institution above politics. Justices as well as litigants must be
bound by procedural rules to avoid the perception that they are
manipulating the system to pursue a substantive agenda. °4
199 Id. at 653.
200 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
201 Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits relief from a
judgment when "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application." FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b)(5), quoted in Agostini, 521 U.S. at 215. The twelve-
year-old precedent was Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
202 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 259 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
203 Id. at 260 (quoting Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 184 U.S. 77, 92
(1902)).
204 Ginsburg made a similar point in her opinion "respecting the denial of
certiorari" in Texas v. Hopwood, the case in which the Fifth Circuit had ruled
unconstitutional an admissions program of the University of Texas Law School
favoring minority applicants. Noting that the university had discontinued the program
at issue and that the petitioners were challenging the rationale rather than the
judgment of the court below, Ginsburg asserted that "we must await a final judgment
on a program genuinely in controversy before addressing the important question raised
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Ginsburg identified a similar institutional concern with
judicial integrity when, in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White,"5 the Court struck down on First Amendment grounds a
Minnesota statute prohibiting judicial candidates from
discussing their views on legal or political issues during
election campaigns. Arguing that elections for judges differ
significantly from elections for political representatives, she
emphasized the role of the judiciary as an "essential bulwark of
constitutional government, a constant guardian of the rule of
law."" 6 Permitting judges to stake out positions on issues that
may subsequently come before them, however informative to
voters, would endanger litigants' due process rights by giving
judges a personal interest in keeping their campaign promises
and their jobs; it would also weaken the public's faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Ginsburg delivered her criticism of
the majority, particularly Justice Scalia as author of the
Court's opinion, in a particularly oblique manner. In the first
paragraph of her opinion, she quoted two passages on judicial
independence-both authored by Scalia."7 The first, drawn
from one of his dissents, stated simply that "judge[s]
represen[t] the Law;"0 8 the second, drawn from one of his best
known law review articles, described the role of judges as
"stand[ing] up to what is generally supreme in a democracy:
the popular will."0 9 In a footnote, she subsequently cited as
support for Minnesota's restraint on judicial candidates Scalia's
statement at his own confirmation hearing when he declined to
indicate whether he would overrule a precedent: "I think I
would be in a very bad position to adjudicate the case without
being accused of having a less than impartial view of the
matter."210 The message, never quite formulated as a direct
attack, was that all members of the Court share an
institutional commitment to preserving their own judicial
in this petition." Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033, 1034 (1996).
205 122 S.Ct. 2528 (2002).
216 Id. at 2550 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
207 Id.
208 Id. (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 411 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
Id. (quoting Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1175, 1180 (1989)).
210 Republican Party, 122 S.Ct. at 2558 n.4. In an earlier footnote, Ginsburg
pointed out that "every Member of this Court declined to furnish" information on
specific issues "to the Senate, and presumably to the President as well" during the
confirmation process. Id. at 2551 n.1.
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independence and that the majority's refusal to accept
Minnesota's similar concern was inconsistent, ill-founded and
lacking in respect for the constitutional balance between
"judicial integrity and free expression" struck by the state
legislature. 11
As this oblique criticism illustrates, the style of
Ginsburg's dissents, like their content, reflects her chosen
principles of appellate decisionmaking. Although she has
recognized that the dissenter is understandably tempted to
produce "spicy" opinions that serve to release frustration with
the majority's obtuseness and willful perversity, she never
succumbs to that temptation. The language of her dissents is in
fact calmer, less critical and less metaphorical than the
language of her Court opinions. Unlike Justice Scalia, in this
respect her opposite on the Court, she never treats the
dissenting opinion as an opportunity to express her disapproval
with bluntness, expansiveness and savage wit.21 Her critiques
of the majority are restrained and measured, with only an
occasional use of mild sarcasm."' Even writing as a "free
lance," Ginsburg remains a collegial Justice and a paragon of
moderation.
In some respects, there is stylistic continuity between
Ginsburg's majority opinions and her dissents. She continues to
invoke variations of the term "pathmarker" to emphasize the
value of precedent,214 and such favorite expressions as "home in
211 Id. at 2559. Ginsburg asserted that the statute at issue "comes to this
Court bearing a weighty title of respect." Id. (citations omitted).
212 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
213 See, e.g., her response to the government's argument that the deletion of
"feloniously" from a federal statute was intended "to grant homesick ex-convicts like
Lewis their wish to return to prison":
Nor can I credit the suggestion that Congress' concern was to cover the
Government's fictional terrorist, or the frustrated account holder who
"withdraws" $100 by force or violence, believing the money to be rightfully
his, or the thrill seeker who holds up a bank with the intent of driving around
the block in a getaway car and then returning the loot, or any other
defendant whose exploits are seldom encountered outside the pages of law
school exams.
Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 284 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The
sarcasm is directed at the government's brief, not squarely at the majority. See also
Ginsburg's criticism of a Scalia concurrence on the subject of equitable relief: "There is
no such thing as an injunction at law, and therefore one cannot expect to find long-ago
plaintiffs who quested after that mythical remedy and received voluntary relief."
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598, 633 n.8. The comment is, characteristically, placed in a footnote.
214 See, e.g., Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 449
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on" and "mine run" make an occasional appearance.215 Her
preferred Shakespeare allusions--"much ado about nothing,"216
"all's well that ends well,"217 and "it must follow, as the night
the day"21 -again appear as uncredited references. 219 There is a
second allusion to Lewis Carroll, this time to Through the
Looking-Glass.22 ° When a prosecuting attorney insisted that
coherence between the defendant's and the complaining
witness' testimony was a sign that the defendant was lying,
Ginsburg objected to the illogic of the argument: "To claim that
such an argument helps find truth at trial is to step completely
through the looking glass."221 Ginsburg also included an oblique
allusion to the Gilbert and Sullivan operetta The Pirates of
Penzance when she referred lightly to the "felonious little
plans" of a defendant anxious to return to prison who notified
the authorities of his intention of robbing a bank.222
(1997) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing court of
appeals opinion as "pathmarking"); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 610
(1996) (referring to the Alabama Supreme Court's "pathmarking decisions"); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 939 n.2 (referring to a Supreme Court vote dilution case as "a
pathmarker"); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 34 (1995) (noting that the United States
supports petitioner but "does not see this case as a proper vehicle for a pathmarking
opinion").
2'5 Both expressions appear in a single sentence in a recent decision.
Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 177 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(observing that earlier cases "home in on the particular proceedings at issue and do not
imply that in the mine run civil action, a plaintiff may dispense with the
straightforward, effective steps required to secure proof of service or waiver of formal
service").
216 Evans, 514 U.S. at 31 (noting that requests for reconsideration are not
.much ado about nothing").
... Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 489 n.1 (1995) (concluding with regard to
a liberty interest that "[a]ll's well that ends well' cannot be the measure here").
"" Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 94 (2000) (noting
that "[i]t does not follow like the night the day, however, that the party resisting
arbitration" must also carry the burden of showing financial inaccessibility).
2'9 There may also be a more oblique Shakespearean allusion when Ginsburg
asks whether a rule that leads defendants to negotiate settlement terms and counsel
fees "is not a consummation to applaud, not deplore?" Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home,
Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 639 (2001). The
question echoes a line in Hamlet's celebrated soliloquy, speaking of death and asking
whether "'tis a consummation Devoutly to be wish'd." HAMLET, supra note 113, act 3,
sc. 1, 11. 70-71.
220 Lewis Carroll, Through The Looking-Glass And What Alice Found There,
in ALICE IN WONDERLAND, supra note 117, at 101.
221 Portuando v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 79 n.1 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
222 Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 283 (2000). Ginsburg is describing
an earlier circuit court case cited by the government in support of its theory and not
referring to the defendant in the case under review, which explains the lightness of
tone. The phrase, unattributed by Ginsburg, is contained in the policeman's song in Act
II of The Pirates of Penzance. The relevant verse follows:
When a felon's not engaged in his employment-
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In other respects, however, Ginsburg's dissents seem
deliberately more muted than her majority opinions. She uses a
handful of metaphors, but none is elaborated in the manner of
her sphinx-like beast.23 Thus, a statute with unreconciled
provisions is "janus faced,"224 a presumption is an "imperfect
barometer of state courts' intent"225 and a state supreme court
"could have displayed its labor pains more visibly."" In a few
instances, she extends metaphors slightly. The Court relies on
"the 'sufficiency of the evidence' label,... but the label will not
stick," 7 and it is irrational to believe that "only a defendant's
opportunity to spin a web of lies could explain the seamlessness
of his testimony." '28 One such extended image comes close to
punning; the Court's opinion lacked examples and thus left its
readers "at sea, unable to fathom" the Court's meaning." 9 None
of these images, however, is formulated as a direct attack on
the majority.
The tone of the dissents is consistently unemotional,
and Ginsburg tends to characterize the majority opinion she
His employment,
Or maturing his felonious little plans-
Little plans,
His capacity for innocent enjoyment-
'Cent enjoyment-
Is just as great as any honest man's-
Honest man's.
WILLIAM S. GILBERT & ARTHUR SULLIVAN, The Pirates of Penzance, in 1 THE COMPLETE
ANNOTATED GILBERT AND SULLIVAN 145-46 (Ian Bradley ed., 1985). Ginsburg's
familiarity with the Gilbert and Sullivan operettas is made clear by her quotation, in a
law review article, of a passage from Iolanthe to discuss the principle of judicial
neutrality:
That Nature always does contrive
That ev'ry boy and ev'ry gal
That's born into the world alive
Is either a little Liberal
Or else a little Conservative.
The passage is quoted in Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Inviting Judicial Activism: A 'Liberal'
or 'Conservative' Technique?, 15 GA. L. REV. 539, 557 (1981) (quoting Iolanthe). This
familiarity is not surprising in light of her well known love of opera. She has appeared
in costume, together with Justice Scalia, as an extra in a performance of Ariadne auf
Naxos at the Washington Opera. Opera a High Note for Ginsburg, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Mar. 5, 2001, at A2. See also ELEANOR H. AYER, RUTH BADER GINSBURG: FIRE AND
STEEL ON THE SUPREME COURT 108 (1994).
223 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
224 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 956 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
225 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 31 (1995).
226 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 611 (1996).
227 Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 561 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
228 Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 86 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
229 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 490 n.2 (1995).
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rejects as "enigmatic""' or "puzzling" "' rather than deliberately
distorted or flagrantly wrong. A few of her opinions are
surprisingly conversational and even playful in presenting the
bases for their disagreement.232  In Muscarello v. United
States,233 the most sustained example, where Ginsburg rejected
the majority's conclusion that the word "carries" in a firearm
statute imposed an enhanced sentence on a defendant who
merely transports or possesses a gun, she clearly relished the
process of linguistic analysis. Ginsburg's primary argument
was that words derive their meaning from context, and she
pursued the varied meanings for what she called "the hydra-
headed word" '234  through newspapers, biblical references,
poetry, films and television programs. Referring to variations
in biblical language for a single passage, she observed dryly
that "[tihe translator of the Good Book, it appears, bore
responsibility for determining whether the servants of Ahaziah
'carried' his corpse to Jerusalem."2 5 Dry wit gave way to antic
humor when she quoted Hawkeye Pierce's dialogue from the
television series Mash:
I will not carry a gun.... I'll carry your books, I'll carry a torch, I'll
carry a tune, I'll carry on, carry over, carry forward, Cary Grant,
cash and carry, carry me back to Old Virginia, I'll even "hari-kari" if
you show me how, but I will not carry a gun!
236
Responding to the government's reliance on the use of
"carries" in other statutes, Ginsburg invoked another television
series, Sesame Street, and annotated its familiar refrain that
"one of these things [a statute authorizing conduct] is not like
the other [a statute criminalizing conduct].",2 The lighthearted
references were accompanied by an unusually informal tone.
She responded with "[q]uite right"28 to the government's claim
230 Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 455 (1997).
231 City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 187 (1997).
232 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 417 (1999) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("I would demur (say so what) to that position"); Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 275 (1995) ("yielded a pass"); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
937 (1995) ("hence no muscle to lobby the legislature for change").
233 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
23 Id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
235 Id. at 142 n.4.
236 Id. at 144 n.6.
237 Id. at 147 n.ll.
238 Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 147 n.11. Ginsburg has referred to the same
refrain from Sesame Street in another dissent. See City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of
Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 183 (1997) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("But one of these things
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before undermining it, and patiently conceded that "[y]es, the
words 'carry' and 'transport' often can be employed
interchangeably"239 before pointing out Congress' awareness of
their discrete meanings. Most of these usages appeared in
footnotes, where Ginsburg typically locates her criticisms of
other Justices as a way of blunting their impact. Nonetheless,
the presence of a light note in a dissent, particularly one in
which the length of the defendant's confinement is at stake, is
a surprising departure from her usually sober tone. The dissent
suggested her sensitivity to the nuances of words and the care
with which she chooses them when she is putting herself in
opposition to her colleagues, but it also suggested that she is
more inclined to moderate her criticism with playfulness than
to intensify it with an aggressively hostile tone.
It is characteristic of Ginsburg that even her strongest
dissents avoid the soaring rhetoric other members of the Court
often use. In her recent dissent in the student drug testing
case, however, she came closer than usual to such language,
though with her own twist. In the closing paragraphs of the
opinion, Ginsburg applied Justice Brandeis's notion of
government teaching the people by its example, observing that
"government is nowhere more a teacher than when it runs a
public school."240 She found it "a sad irony" that the school
district's testing policy failed to meet that obligation and
instead imposed "symbolic measures that diminish
constitutional protections. " " ' The final sentence of the opinion
does soar, but only because it was written by one of the Court's
great stylists, Justice Jackson, in a celebrated decision striking
down a school board resolution requiring all students,
regardless of their religious principles, to salute the flag: "That
[schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source
and teach youth to discount important principles of our
government as mere platitudes."242 A comparison of Jackson's
prose with Ginsburg's is instructive. Where her language is
is not necessarily like the other.").
239 Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 147 n.10.
240 Bd. of Educ. of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 122
S.Ct. 2559, 2578 (2002).
241 id.
242 Id. (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943)).
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clear, direct and syntactically straightforward, Jackson's
sentence is metaphorical, complex and dramatic in its image of
strangulation. As her own occasional metaphorical indulgences
indicate, Ginsburg has an ear for language and an appreciation
for its possibilities. She remains, however, true to her
principles of moderation and collegiality, allowing a
remarkably gifted colleague to express her sentiments instead
of attempting her own stylistic adventure.
IV. WRITING TO CONCUR
The concurrence occupies an ambiguous position in
Supreme Court decisionmaking. A Justice who concurs neither
endorses a colleague's opinion wholeheartedly nor rejects it
decisively. Instead, the concurring Justice signals a willingness
to accompany the author part of the way while still asserting
the need to specify their differences in print.243 The resulting
concurrence may modify the majority opinion in a number of
ways, most often by limiting or expanding its holding or simply
by emphasizing one aspect as the most significant.2" In its
more extreme form, the concurrence may accept only the
majority's result and reject its rationale completely; in that
case, the Justice concurs only in the Court's judgment and
formulates an independent legal theory. Whichever form the
disagreement takes, the concurring Justice has breached the
norm of collegiality with less compelling reason than the
dissenter, who is unable to accept either the Court's result or
its rationale. It would seem that a Justice strongly committed
to collegiality would find it easier to dispense with a
concurrence than with a dissent, to swallow hard and join a
majority opinion that is unsatisfactory in some way but not
totally abhorrent. It would, in short, seem that Ginsburg would
be less likely to concur than to dissent and that her record on
the Court would reflect that tendency.
Surprisingly, Ginsburg has written more concurrences
than dissents. In nine Terms she has produced fifty
14' For a discussion of the nature of the concurrence, see Laura Krugman Ray,
The Justices Write Separately: Uses of the Concurrence by the Rehnquist Court, 23 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 777, 780-83 (1990).
244 The Rehnquist Court has used several varieties of concurrence for a range
of purposes. These include the limiting concurrence, the expansive concurrence, the
emphatic concurrence, and the doctrinal concurrence. For an analysis of these various
forms of concurrence, see id. at 784-809.
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concurrences, compared to her forty-nine dissents.245 She was
most prolific in her first Term, writing ten concurrences; in
more recent Terms she has slowed her pace, writing between
three and six separate opinions instead.246 Fourteen of her
opinions concurred only in the Court's judgment, indicating the
strongest basis for divergence. Ginsburg has written twenty-
eight concurrences for herself alone and has been joined by one
or more colleagues in the remaining twenty-two. Justice Breyer
is her most frequent companion, joining ten times; neither
Justice Scalia nor Justice Thomas has ever joined one of her
concurrences.247 Her record of concurrences places her above the
Court average in five Terms out of nine.248 She remains,
however, significantly below Justice Scalia, the Court's most
prolific concurrer, though also significantly above Chief Justice
Rehnquist, its least prolific.249
This statistical summary does not fully reveal
Ginsburg's approach to concurring opinions. Most of her
concurrences are remarkably short, many are no more than a
single paragraph, and a few are no longer than a handful of
sentences. She ends one three-sentence opinion with the
observation that "I see no need to say more,"25° which might
serve as the motto for her concurring enterprise. These
opinions seldom engage the substance of the majority opinion
in a sustained argument. They are in the nature of brief
comments on the majority's work rather than serious efforts to
counter that work with alternate theories or detailed critiques.
Ginsburg seems most interested in characterizing what the
Court has done, with an eye to its future jurisprudence. In the
words of one of her favorite expressions, she is serving as an
auxiliary way paver, making sure that the record reflects the
exact parameters of the Court's opinion so that it will not be
245 See supra note 44.
246 Id.
141 Of her other current colleagues, Souter has joined Ginsburg's concurrences
six times, Stevens five times, O'Connor five times, and Rehnquist and Kennedy once
each. Statistics compiled by the author.
14" Averages computed by the author based on data from the Harvard Law
Review's annual statistical summaries, supra note 44.
... Scalia has averaged ten concurrences over the past nine Terms, with his
highest output, nineteen, occurring in the 1993 Term. In contrast, Rehnquist averaged
1.2 for the same period, which included four Terms in which he filed no concurrences.
Averages computed by the author based on data from the Harvard Law Review's
annual statistical summaries, supra note 44.
250 Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 512 (2001)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (per curiam).
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misapplied to constrict or distort the next opinion in the
jurisprudential line.
The consistent motif in most of Ginsburg's concurrences
is her determination to limit the reach of the Court's opinion.
In its purest form, she offers this determination as the sole
basis for the concurrence, as when she states clearly that "I
write separately only to emphasize that we do not decide today
a question on which the Courts of Appeals remain divided." 5'
She may specify that she "read[s] the Court's decision to leave
open "21 a particular question or more precisely "as reserving
the question" 3 that concerns her.254 In other cases, she may
recognize the implications of the decision and insist that the
current posture of the case does not allow the Court to resolve a
related issue. For instance, agreeing with the majority that
waiver may permit the government to impeach by using
statements from plea bargaining negotiations, she noted that
use of the same statements "in the case in chief would more
severely undermine a defendant's incentive to negotiate, and
thereby inhibit plea bargaining."55 Since the government had
not requested the second kind of waiver, "we do not here
explore this question."
2 56
Ginsburg's concurrences play variations on this central
motif. She "resistled] in this case the plea to 'break new
ground,' 2 7 while looking ahead in another case she "note[d]
251 United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 361 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
252 Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S.
765, 789 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
253 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 666 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). See also Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
("The Court thus does not foreclose the possibility that the fundamental fairness we
describe as 'due process' calls for notice and a comprehension check.").
25 A particularly striking example of this use occurs in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., a sexual harassment case decided in the autumn of Ginsburg's first Term
on the Court, in which she joined Justice O'Connor's majority opinion holding a hostile
work environment sufficient to establish a Title VII claim of gender discrimination. 510
U.S. 17 (1993). Adding a brief concurrence, Ginsburg noted in a footnote that "it
remains an open question whether 'classifications based on gender are inherently
suspect,'" an issue she had litigated vigorously but unsuccessfully earlier in her career.
Id. at 26 n.* (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
215 United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 211 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
256 Id. See also Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523
U.S. 135, 154 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("I join the Court's opinion recognizing
that we do not today resolve cases in which the allegedly infringing imports were
manufactured abroad.").
2" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 281 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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that it may be incumbent on the Court, in an appropriate case,
to define more precisely" relevant categories beyond those
already discussed.258 In one case she insisted that she "would
not prejudge the question" arising "when and if' respondents
seek review,"' while in another she noted that she would
"resist expounding or offering advice on the constitutionality of
what Congress might have done, but did not do."26° In a First
Amendment case where the Court struck down a state statute
prohibiting the circulation of anonymous campaign literature,
Ginsburg used her concurrence to anticipate explicitly
situations in which the result might well be different: "We do
not thereby hold that the State may not, in other, larger
circumstances require the speaker to disclose its interest by
disclosing its identity." 6'
Ginsburg sometimes makes her insistence on limiting
the reach of the Court's opinion the condition for her
willingness to join the majority. She may explain her
interpretation and note that "[o]n this understanding, I join the
Court's opinion, "262 or define "the precise issue" decided and join
"[w]ith the caveat that I do not read today's opinion as
precedent foreclosing issues not tendered for review."262 All
these variations have in common her tendency to contract an
opinion to the narrow issue before the Court and to defer until
a more suitable time the exploration of its ramifications. When
in a recent case the Court limited tribal court jurisdiction,
Ginsburg announced that "I write separately only to emphasize
that Strate v. A-1 Contractors . . . similarly deferred larger
issues."264 Sounding her familiar insistence on limitation, she
concluded that "[tihe Court's opinion, as I understand it, does
not reach out definitively to answer the jurisdictional questions
left open in Strate."
265
"8 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 154 (2000)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
2'9 Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 492
(1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
260 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 134 (1998) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in the judgment).
28 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 358 (1995) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring).
262 Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 650 (1997) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
26 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 471 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
26 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 425 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
265 Id.
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Just as Ginsburg is careful to delineate what the Court
is not deciding, she is also at times equally careful to
emphasize what she considers the most significant aspects of
an opinion she joins. In two concurrences to cases decided in
1996, she used an identical formula to open her separate
opinions: "I join the opinion of the Court and highlight features
of the case key to my judgment."266 Ginsburg made significantly
different use of the emphatic concurrence in Brogan v. United
States67 when she joined only in the Court's holding that a
plain denial of wrongdoing was covered by the federal statute
criminalizing false statements made to government
investigators. Concurring in the judgment, she conceded that
the broad statutory language included such false denials, but
she used her opinion to argue at some length a larger point
concerning the statute. "I write separately," she explained, "to
call attention to the extraordinary authority Congress, perhaps
unwittingly, has conferred on prosecutors to manufacture
crimes."266 The opinion then proceeded to explain the potential
for prosecutorial abuse, the legislative history of the statute,
government policy covering prosecutions under the statute and
proposals for reform.269 It concluded with the observation that
"[tihe extensive airing this issue has received, however, may
better inform the exercise of Congress' lawmaking authority."7 °
Her concurrence was a deliberate part of that extensive airing,
used as an educational tool to explore in detail the negative
consequences of a statute that she felt compelled by its text to
interpret as upholding the defendant's conviction.
Ginsburg's use of the concurrence to limit or to
emphasize some aspect of the Court's opinion contrasts with
her use of majority and dissenting opinions to articulate her
favorite themes, which appear infrequently in her concurring
opinions. She did, however, on one occasion assert the norm of
collegiality, chiding the dissent for its failure to show respect to
a state supreme court and for its attack on the trial court, 71
2M Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 434 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring); Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 457 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
See also Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 78 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("I concur in
the Court's opinion and write separately to highlight a causation issue still open for
determination on remand.").
267 522 U.S. 398, 408 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
268 id.
269 Id. at 410-18.
270 Id. at 418.
27' Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 457 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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and in another case she briefly invoked her preference for "real-
life examples" as a basis for legal reasoning.272 In two other
concurrences she sounded a familiar note of caution, in one
case adding "a cautionary note"273 and in the other agreeing
"that it is wise to remand, erring, if at all, on the side of
caution."274
In general, however, the concurrences most often work
to place majority opinions in context rather than to address the
substance of even the most controversial issues. The companion
cases of Washington v. Glucksberg275 and Vacco v. Quill,276 in
which the Court unanimously rejected physician assisted
suicide as a substantive due process right, illustrate Ginsburg's
restrained use of the form. Justices O'Connor, Stevens, Souter
and Breyer all filed concurring opinions of some length to
address the difficult issue before the Court. In contrast,
Ginsburg filed a one sentence opinion, applicable to both cases,
concurring in the judgments: "I concur in the Court's
judgments in these cases substantially for the reasons stated
by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion . . . .""' She
resisted even the temptation to explain the reservation implied
by "substantially," instead letting her slightly opaque sentence
speak for itself.
Ginsburg exhibited similar reserve three years later,
when the Court in Stenberg v. Carhart275  struck down
Nebraska's statute prohibiting "partial birth abortion" by a
vote of five to four; Justice Breyer wrote for the majority, and
each of the other eight Justices wrote separately. Ginsburg's
opinion consisted of two paragraphs and opened with
characteristic restraint: "I write separately only to stress that
amidst all the emotional uproar caused by an abortion case, we
should not lose sight of the character of Nebraska's 'partial
birth abortion' law."279 Her opinion consisted largely of a
paraphrase of Stevens's concurrence and of quotations from the
majority opinion, from Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
272 Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 21 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
273 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41 (1997)
(Ginburg, J., concurring).
274 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 656 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
275 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
276 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
277 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgments).
278 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
279 Id. at 951 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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Pennsylvania v. Casey s° and from Chief Judge Posner's
Seventh Circuit dissenting opinion on a similar statute."s' In
combination, these sources served to define an undue burden,
and Ginsburg synthesized them, without adding more than a
few connective passages in her own words, to conclude that the
Nebraska statute created such an unconstitutional obstacle.8 '
She condensed into this brief opinion her respect for both
precedent and a distinguished circuit court colleague, together
with her dispassionate approach to the most volatile of issues.
Speaking largely through the voices of others, she used her
concurrence to distill a consensus based not on emotion but on
reasoned judicial discourse.
The preference for restraint that marks the approach
and substance of Ginsburg's concurrences is evident as well in
their style. These opinions are plainer in language than her
other opinions, both majority and dissenting, and less likely to
contain metaphorical or colorful language. The concurrences
use her signature expressions-mine run, home in on,
pathmarking-only a few times. "3 There are also only a few
metaphors. In one opinion she doubts that "Congress intended
. . . to cast so large a net"" in drafting its statute, and in
another she "would not venture further into the mist
surrounding" an unclear statute.285  One of her earliest
concurrences included a sustained metaphor comparing a
criminal prosecution to a play; the prosecutor is the "principal
player," while under the defendant's theory of the case "the
star player is exonerated, but the supporting actor is not."286 In
one curious exception to her marked tendency to avoid colorful
language, Ginsburg used an unusual expression to describe the
Court's limited holding: "In for a calf is not always in for a
28 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
281 Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 881 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J.,
dissenting).
22 Steinberg, 530 U.S. at 951-52 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
"' See Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533, 548 (2002)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (using "pathmarking"); Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 210-12 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (using "mine run" and
"home in on"); Central State Univ. v. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 526 U.S. 124, 129
(1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (using "mine run").
2 Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 412 (1998).
Raygor, 534 U.S. at 549.
286 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 279 n.5 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
The passage also refers to "the police officer's role." Id.
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cow, "287 apparently a variant of the more familiar "in for a
penny, in for a pound."
Otherwise, the concurrences are notable for only two
other usages. Acknowledging a change in her position, she
quoted Justice Frankfurter's graceful endorsement of such
reversals: "Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not
to reject it merely because it comes late."2" Finally, in one of
her few attributed literary allusions, she found support for the
existence of unintoxicated but still careless drivers in the work
of a celebrated American humorist: "It is not only in fiction, see
J. Thurber, The Secret Life of Walter Mitty (1983) (originally
published in The New Yorker in 1939), but, sadly, in real life as
well, that sober people drive while daydreaming or otherwise
failing to pay attention to the road."289 Walter Mitty is a
whimsical character, but as invoked in this passage, complete
with its double attribution, the reference is somber rather than
playful and in keeping with the general tenor of her
concurrences.
CONCLUSION
Justice Ginsburg's jurisprudence offers a remarkably
precise reflection of her theories of appellate judging. Her
opinions consistently follow the path of moderation, avoiding
both expansive legal formulations and harsh attacks on those
who disagree with her positions. This is not to say that she is
driven entirely by the narrowest demands of the case at hand.
Her body of work makes clear that there are certain issues on
which she holds strong views that inform her approach to cases
raising them. These issues include, most prominently: racial
discrimination, before the Court in affirmative action,
redistricting and desegregation cases; gender discrimination,
extending to the use of stereotypes to define or limit any group;
fidelity to the rules governing the litigation process as the
surest way to protect due process rights; and the role of the
federal courts as protectors of constitutional rights. Even in
cases raising these issues, Ginsburg refrains from sweeping
287 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 358 (1995).
2M Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 22 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(quoting Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
289 Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 60 n.1 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring
in the judgment).
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statements or ringing pronouncements, and she does not
provide her readers with a supply of readily quotable passages.
Her opinions tend to look inward rather than outward. They
are scholarly in tone and likely to contain detailed procedural
histories, multiple footnotes and abundant citations to
precedent. They are not, however, likely to stake out broad
positions that might constrain her options in later cases.
Ginsburg's opinions also consistently demonstrate
respect for her colleagues. The tone of even her most strongly
argued opinions remains calm, and her criticisms of her
opponents, often tucked away in footnotes, are couched in
measured language that expresses bewilderment rather than
anger or scorn. As someone who has deplored in print the
willingness of appellate judges to write separately, she has
produced a surprising number of dissents and concurrences on
the Supreme Court. Paradoxically, these opinions document
her principles of restraint. Her dissents are most often
prompted by the majority's failure to follow precedent, to
respect the appropriate role of another court or branch of
government or to discipline the reach of its opinion. Her
concurrences are usually quite short and tend to share a
common theme, the limited nature of the majority decision she
has joined. These separate opinions are never occasions for
fiery attacks or emotional outpourings. Far from seeking to
draw attention to herself, she writes to deflect that attention
back to the Court's opinion and its failings. She regrets the
errors of her colleagues and views it as her judicial
responsibility to address them, but she takes no obvious
pleasure in the act of divergence.
Finally, Ginsburg's opinions consistently locate her as
part of a jurisprudential tradition in which she serves not as an
independent actor but as a way paver, a contributor to an
ongoing judicial process. Writing for the Court, she feels
constrained by precedent and by her allegiance to the
institutional values embodied by the Court's past history.
Writing separately, she asks whether her colleagues have
recognized their duty to subordinate individual views to the
broader context in which the Court operates. Her opinions
reflect her preference for a cautious approach to legal change
and her reluctance to move the Court forward too aggressively.
They reflect as well her sense of herself as a member of the
select company of Supreme Court Justices who prepare the
ground for their successors.
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Justice Ginsburg's middle way is an amalgam of these
principles. She is dispassionate but not detached, concerned
with methodology but committed to a core of strong ideological
beliefs, independent but a willing part of the traditions that
have shaped the law and her career. Her opinions consistently
subordinate the elements of judicial personality-the stylistic
and substantive features that distinguish the work of a
particular Justice-to a blander, less assertive voice that
invites collaboration rather than conflict or competition. As a
member of the Court, she pursues a balanced response to "the
competing tugs" of caution and principle, of tradition and
change, of collegiality and individuality, that she has described
as the challenge of the judicial role.
